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REDEFINING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
MURRAY L. SACKMAN *
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been tumultuous change in the various
frameworks governing collective bargaining in the public sector of
employment.' Practical experience, mainly in the last decade, has prompted
reevaluation of some of the fundamental assumptions on which were based
the initial approaches to defining the scope and process of public sector
bargaining structures. This reevaluation, in turn, has generated a move to-
ward redefining the initial public sector bargaining structures. Changing
economic and political climates have contributed significantly to this re-
definitional process. The adverse economic impact of recession, un-
employment, inflation and fiscal crisis has touched off hostile political re-
actions by taxpayers and their representatives to the results of public sector
collective bargaining. In addition, conceptual and political conflicts con-
tinue to exist over the proper role of collective bargaining in the political
process which allocates governmental resources. These conflicts, which
today remain either unresolved or poorly resolved, represent an attempt to
balance broad public interest in the level, nature and quality of govern-
mental services with the interest of public employees in their conditions of
employment. Moreover, the ultimate resolution of this conceptual and
political balancing in the redefinitional process is threatened by fluctuation
in the political power of, and support for, public employees.
As part of the redefinitional process, and in response to the changing
* B.A. Brandeis University, 1974; ID., Har -yard University, 1977. Presently law clerk
for the Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts.
The author wishes to express a deep sense of gratitude to his wife Perrie for her love
and understanding throughout the writing of this article and to Harry T. Edwards, Professor
of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, who inspired this article and gave freely of
his ideas, teaching and support.
' The duty to bargain between state and local governments and their employees, if such
a duty exists, is generally established in one of three ways: state legislation, see, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch . 150E, §§ 1 et seq. (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ. SERV, LAW H. 200 et seq. (McKinney's
Supp. 1976); executive order, see, e.g., Ill. Exec. Order No. 6 (1.973) (state employees); Exec.
Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1974) (federal employees); or, municipal or county enact-
ment, see, e.g., Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Ordinance No. 141,527 (1971), reprinted in GOVT.
EMPL REL REP. (BNA) Ref. File 51:1419 [hereinafter GERRI; Los Angeles, Cal., County Ordi-
nance (Sept, 3, 1968), reprinted in GERR Ref. File 51:1426.
The legislative or executive source of the bargaining obligation defines to varying de-
grees the scope of bargainable issues and other features of the bargaining process, such as un-
fair labor practices, impasse resolution procedures, and whether employees have the right to
strike. Further definition of the scope of mandatory or permissible bargaining is often left to
administrative agencies, where they exist, or to state courts. Thus the frameworks for collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector may contain legislative, executive, judicial and administra-
tive components to varying degrees. In addition, the scope of bargaining may be affected by
existing legislation, municipal enactment, or administrative regulation independent of the bar-
gaining framework. It should be noted that not all jurisdictions require or even permit collec-
tive bargaining and that in those that do, not all public employees are granted collective bar-
gaining rights.
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attitudes about the proper role of collective bargaining in the political pro-
cess, many public sector jurisdictions have recently altered, legislatively or
judicially, the scope of mandatory and/or permissive bargaining. 2
 The ini-
tial redefinitional trends appeared to favor broadening the scope of per-
missive bargaining while striking a balance between the scope of mandatory
and permissive bargaining. 2
 More recently when public employees have
sought judicial enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, there
has been a movement toward restricting the permissible scope of bargain-
ing in order to protect public policy concerns. 4 Neither of these ap-
proaches, however, has confronted adequately the political conflict that un-
derlies public sector bargaining. A permissive category of bargaining issues,
part of the baggage of the years of private sector bargaining experience,
may not be justifiable in public sector bargaining. The permissive category
ostensibly preserves the political accountability of decisions involving man-
agerial policy and prerogative. However, the permissive category can dull
sensitivity to considerations of the political process in which public sector
bargaining takes place if inexperienced or politically expedient public em-
ployers are allowed to make unilateral and unaccountable decisions on
permissive subjects of bargaining. Furthermore, the focus of the permissive
category on managerial prerogative and policy rather than on more purely
public policy concerns has been used to justify both too great an intrusion
into the appropriate subjects of mandatory bargaining and too wide a
range of permissible bargaining in the form of the public employer's dis-
cretionary decision to bargain or not. For these reasons, the redefinitional
approaches which continue to utilize the permissive category fail to sepa-
rate out those issues which should be resolved in a political context from
those which should be resolved in a bargaining context.
In addition to confronting inadequately the mandatory-permissive
scope of bargaining, the reappraisals and redefinitions have also not gone
far enough to resolve the wider structural problems raised by the bargain-
ing experiences of the last decade. Some jurisdictions have established or
expanded the functions of existing administrative agencies (PERBs), 5
loosened restrictions on the right to strike, 6 and mandated binding impasse
resolution procedures.' But the tentative steps taken in these directions and
the dogged resistance in particular to allowing the right to strike or some
form of binding impasse resolution indicate that many jurisdictions have
yet a tougher reappraisal process ahead.
This article will examine the factors which have prompted the re-
2 "Mandatory" subjects of bargaining are those subjects over which employer and
employees have an obligation to bargain in good faith to the point of impasse. At impasse the
employer may act unilaterally. "Permissive" subjects of bargaining are those issues over which
either side may but is not required to bargain. Neither side may insist on a permissive issue to
the point of impasse or as a condition to agreement on other issues. If agreement is reached
on a permissive issue, however, it is binding. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v.
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).
'See text at notes 88-100 and 118-30 infra.
'See text at notes 101-17 infra.
5
 See note 49 infra. PERB stands for Public Employment Relations Board. It is the
generic term that will be used in this article when reference is made generally to administra-
tive agencies whose functions in the public sector is similar to those of the National Labor Re-
lations Board in the private sector.
°See text and note 33 infra.
'See text and note 36 infra.
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appraisal and redefinitional process: the conceptual political conflict, the
economic and political climate, and practical experience with the traditional
public sector strike ban and absence of alternative impasse resolution pro-
cedures. After discussing initial approaches to the scope of bargaining issue
in public employment, the redefinitional response, influenced by the above
factors, will be discussed and evaluated. Finally, it will be submitted that use
of the mandatory/permissive scope of bargaining framework is not war-
ranted in the public sector, and that a mandatory/illegal framework would
best protect the interests of public employees, employers, and the public at
large.
I. FACTORS PROMPTING REAPPRAISAL, AND REDEFINITION
A. Conceptual Political Conflict
Collective bargaining in the public sector is inseparable from the polit-
ical process allocating governmental resources and structuring social re-
lationships. As stated in one commentary, "what is involved in public sector
bargaining is the redistribution of income by government rather than the
allocation of resources by market forces." Public employees compete with
all other interest groups for tax dollars allocated through the governmental
budgetary process. Public employees also seek influence over the nature of
the services they provide. To the extent that issues of concern to public
employees are subject to bargaining,' decisions about such issues are re-
moved from resolution in the political arena. Thus, there is always an un-
derlying political conflict in defining structurally those issues which ought
to or can be locked into a collective bargaining agreement and those issues
which ought to be left open for change and influence in the usual political
process.
Early commentators cautioned legislative bodies that the private sector
bargaining model might make the path to the governmental machinery
allocating resources too smooth for public employee organizations. For
example, Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter argued that the conceptual
political conflict over the proper role of collective bargaining within the
political process should be resolved structurally so as to limit the power of
public employee unions in relations to other interest groups." Two particu-
lar structural features, in their view, required attention.
First, the scope of bargainable issues in public sector bargaining had
to be limited. In the private sector, the argument ran, market restraints
and price competition limit the total bargaining pot. If a private sector
union attempted to expand the scope of bargaining it effectively traded
"more of less for less of more,"'° because additional benefits gained im-
posed a monetary cost on the employer who in the private sector was re-
strained by a competitive market. Thus, benefits gained in one area pre-
dictably resulted in losses in other areas if the employer was to avoid pric-
" Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J.
805, 807 (1970) [hereinafter Wellington & Winter].
9 See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND TILE CITIES Ch. 1 (1971); Wel-
lington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107,
1126 (1969).
3 r1 Wellington & Winter, supra note 8, at 857.
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ing itself out of the market. Furthermore, private sector unions rarely bar-
gain about the nature of the product. Accordingly, an expanded scope of
bargaining in the private sector would lead neither to allocational dis-
tortions nor to changes in the nature of the product or service. In the pub-
lic sector, on the other hand, there appeared to be less of a tradeoff be-
tween subjects of bargaining:
Interest groups will exert pressure against union demands only
when they are directly affected. Otherwise they will join that
large constituency which wants to avoid labor trouble. Tradeoffs
can occur only when several demands are resisted by roughly the
same groups. Thus, budgetary demands can be traded off when
they are opposed by taxpayers. But when the identity of the re-
sisting group changes with each demand, political leaders may
find it expedient to strike a balance on each issue individually,
rather than as part of a total package, by measuring the political
power of the constituency pressing for labor peace. Expansion of
the subjects of bargaining in the public sector, therefore, may in-
crease the total quantum of union power in the political pro-
cess."
Thus, political factors in the public sector may outweigh the financial fac-
tors which in the private sector guarantee a tradeoff on subjects of bargain-
ing. Furthermore, because public employees perform a service, expansion
of the scope of bargaining to include bargaining over the manner or means
of performing the service could change its nature. Wellington and Winter
noted that many public services are performed by professionals who are
concerned precisely with the sensitive political, social and ideological ques-
tions underlying that service. Negotiations resulting in binding agreements
might preclude other affected groups from influence over the nature or
extent of the service they pay for or receive. The influence which affected
groups extend over the nature of public service, Wellington and Winter ar-
gued, should take place in the wider political arena. Thus, the scope of
public sector bargaining should be limited to ensure that all affected
groups can participate in the resolution of any questions related to the na-
ture of the public service provided.
The attempt to resolve structurally the conceptual and political con-
flict underlying public sector bargaining was not limited to concern with
the scope of bargaining. A second structural feature required attention if
the power of public employee groups was to be neutralized. Wellington and
Winter argued that public employees could not be granted the right to
strike:
... If public employee unions are free to strike as well as to
employ the usual methods of political pressure, interest groups
with competing claims and different priorities will be put at a
competitive disadvantage and the political process will be dis-
torted,
In addition, the functioning of the " 'normal' American political
process" will be altered not only in the way it determines mone-
"ld. at 858-59.
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tary issues, critical as they are, but also in the way it resolves
other matters which, while they affect union members, are tradi-
tional grist for the political mill.' 2
Thus, without limits on both the scope of bargaining and the right to
strike, collective bargaining would "... institutionalize the power of the
public employee unions in a way that would leave competing groups in the
political process at a permanent and substantial disadvantage.""
Given that collective bargaining grants a special advantage to public
employees the conflict arises over whether and when such a special position
is warranted. The arena for the conflict is political because the battle is
primarily one of political power over the allocation of governmental re-
sources. This conflict has given rise to much of the redefinitional process as
jurisdictions have reappraised their initial efforts at controlling the power
of public employee unions while granting public employees a meaningful
voice in decisions affecting their working interests.
B. The Economic and Political Climate
The recent period of fiscal crisis has stimulated an extraordinarily
hostile political response to the end results of public sector collective bar-
gaining which is spurring the ongoing process of reappraisal. State and
local governments have been adversely affected both by reduced tax rev-
enues that result from recession and unemployment and by increased
costs and employee demands fueled by inflation. Taxpayer opposition to
the cost of public services has been mounting steadily. The public has re-
acted strongly to the perception that inept managers have "given away the
shop." In order to make known their dissatisfaction, taxpayers have re-
sorted to the political process to override the collective bargaining process.
They have attempted to redefine politically the scope and process of bar-
gaining so as to limit severely the competitive advantage over other interest
groups initially granted by collective bargaining to public employee unions.
Some of the consequences of this taxpayer opposition have been
highly visible. In growing numbers, legislative bodies and the public,
fiercely resisting the rising cost of public services, have been rejecting
budget proposals made by public officials. These rejections have led to
complete curtailments of affected services, including schools, in some areas
of the country." Such resistance has also found expression in the executive
"Id. at 807-08. See also Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1101, 1123 (1969).
" H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 30 (1971).
"Taxpayer rejections of local school levies forced closings of several school districts in
Ohio, Oregon, Connecticut and Washington, GERR No. 688, at 17 (Dec. 27, 1976), GERR No.
691, at 17 (Jan. 17, 1977) and GERR No. 692, at 9-10 (Jan. 24, 1977). In early 1976, the citi-
zens of Swampscott, Massachusetts, voting on a special petition, turned down the town
selectmen's request to appropriate funds for negotiated police and fire lighter agreements.
The special petition had been instituted by that town's school committee, which had hoped
thereby to make available funds for the schools in a backhanded attack on other public
employee negotiations. The Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (MLRC) dismissed un-
fair labor practices filed against the town by the police and fire lighters since the school com-
mittee could not be considered to be agents of the town in its negotiations with those
employees. Town of Swampscott & Firefighters, Local 1499, 3 MASS. LAB. REL. REP. 1003
(MLRC 1976).
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branch of state governments. Governors Carey of New York, Dukakis of
Massachusetts, and Brown of California, all elected with the support of
public employee unions, achieved notoriety for their strong stands against
public employee demands in the face of the fiscal crunch." Moreover, res-
idency requirements for public employees, affirmed by the Supreme Court
on a recent constitutional challenge," have been imposed by many jurisdic-
tions both to assert a measure of political control" and to highlight for
such employees the direct relation between rising labor costs and rising
property tax rates. Other jurisdictions have enacted "sunshine laws" — re-
quiring that meetings of governmental agencies be open to the public — in
order to enhance the political accountability of bargaining decisions." Gov-
ernor. Mills of Virginia went so far as to order his state's attorney-general to
bring suit to declare that, in the absence of an authorizing statute, collective
bargaining agreements between a school board and its teachers would be
void and unenforceable." The state's highest court agreed. 2 ° On the na-
tional level, the depth of resistance to public employee bargaining led back-
ers'of a federal bill establishing minimum standards for state and local gov-
ernment employee bargaining to retreat and retrench." This reawakened
interest in the costs of public employee collective bargaining by citizens and
elected officials has exerted pressure on the redefinitional process. 22
In Berlin, Connecticut, the Association of Concerned Taxpayers forced the collective
bargaining contract with its teachers to a special referendum. The pact proposals were de-
feated twice before being finally approved by only 42 votes in May of 1977. GERR No. 711, at
19 Uune 6, 1977).
92 One commentator associates Brown and Dukakis with what he calls "the militant em-
bourgeoisification of the electorate." Weber, Prospects for the Future, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3, 7 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) [hereinafter KNAPP]. Governor Carey man-
aged to impose a salary freeze on state employees for 1976. More recently, he attempted to
subject binding interest arbitration of bargaining impasses to approval by local legislative
bodies when New York's binding arbitration law came up for legislative extension. He lost that
struggle. See GERR No. 713, at 16-17 (June 20, 1977). Governor Dukakis went so far as to
veto the legislative extension of Massachusetts's arbitration statute but his veto was overridden.
GERR No. 716, at 13 (July II, 1977).
19
	v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 647 (1976).
" One such requirement enacted by the Boston School Committee immediately after
the Supreme Court decision was challenged as an unfair labor practice and held subject to
mandatory bargaining by the MLRC. Boston School Comm. and Boston Teachers Union, 3
MASS. LAB. REL. REP. 1148 (MLRC 1977). But cf. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n v. Teamsters
Local 563, 75 Wis.2d 602, 250 N.W.2d 696 (1977) (holding that a city and union could not
bargain out of an ordinance requiring residency).
IS A recent Colorado decision held a collective bargaining agreement entered into in
violation of the open meeting law void and unenforceable. Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe
County School Dist. No. 6,Colo., 553 P.2d 793 (1976).
19 Raskin, The Current Political Contest, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS: A STUDY OF THE
CRISIS IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 203, 209 (ed. 1976) [hereinafter RASKIN).
22
 Virginia v. Bd. of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977). A Colorado
decision reached the opposite conclusion but held the agreement unenforceable since it was in
violation of the open meeting law. Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County School Dist. No.
6, Colo., 553 P.2d 793 (1976).
91
 RASKIN, supra note 19, at 211. The Supreme Court recently resurrected the 10th
Amendment in holding unconstitutional extensions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state
employees. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), noted in, 18 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. REV. 736 (1976).
22
 The economic climate in New York City led to an effective redefinition of the scope
and process of bargaining for the foreseeable future. In response to the deteriorating financial
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The impetus to politicize the collective bargaining process comes from
public employees as well as from taxpayers and elected officials. For exam-
ple, when New York's Emergency Financial Control Board rejected the
agreement reached between the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and
the Board of Education of New York City after a strike in 1975, the UFT
sought help from the state legislature. The legislature passed a bill mandat-
ing that the proportion of the educational appropriation in the city's
budget be equal to previous years." After tortuous political maneuvers the
legislature even overrode a gubernatorial veto for the first time in eighty
years in order to keep the bill alive. The money from that bill has yet to be
seen, 24 but the experience illustrates the ability of public employees to
situation in New York City the slate legislature in 1975 created an Emergency Financial Con-
trol Board (EFCB) with the authority to approve proposed collective bargaining agreements
reached with public employee unions in New York City. The Board responded by exercising
its authority not only to reject the total costs of proposed agreements, but also to eliminate
from agreements specific provisions considered to be inefficient or too costly and to insist on
specific cost-saving provisions such as productivity levels. The EFCB used its authority to re-
ject an agreement reached between the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and the Board
of Education after a strike in 1975. Only fifteen months later did the parties reach a new
agreement. GERR No. 689, at 16 (Jan. 3, 1977). EFCB also postponed cost of living increases
in an agreement between the Transit Authority and the Transport Workers Union and
enacted a productivity requirement to apply to all newly negotiated contracts. Bargaining in
New York City has been so affected by the spectre of bankruptcy that Albert Shanker, pres-
ident of the UFT proposed that collective bargaining be suspended for the duration of the fi-
nancial emergency. See The New York Times, Nov. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 3. To prove that the
suggestion was serious, the LIFT also took out a paid advertisement. The New York Times,
Nov. 21, 1976, at 9, sec. IV, col. 5.
The hostile political climate in San Francisco created a politicized bargaining process
which has redefined the scope and process of bargaining. In July of 1976, after a long period
of public employee strife, the S'an Francisco Board of Supervisors abolished the Municipal
Employee Relations Panel (MERP) while MERP was investigating eighteen unfair labor prac-
tice charges filed against the Board of Supervisors and its negotiators since the beginning of
the unrest. GERR No. 671, at 11-15 (Aug. 23, 1976). As an additional response to public
employee strikes the San Francisco voters approved a number of referendum issues restricting
the bargaining power of public employees in the general November elections. The voters re-
moved several traditional issues from the scope of bargaining. They authorized the Board of'
Supervisors to subcontract work, without bargaining with the affected employees, whenever
lower costs could be achieved. See GERR No. 683, at B-14 Proposition J. (Nov. 15, 1976).
They voted reduced pension benefits for newly hired police officers and firefighters. See id.
Proposition L. The voters enacted severely restrictive impasse resolution procedures. One
proposal approved provides that if by March 15 of any year there remains a bargaining im-
passe over salary, the union's last wage demand is to be submitted to the voters. If rejected,
the last wage offer of the Board of Supervisors will automatically become effective. See id.
Proposition 0; GERR Ref. File 51:1440, The voters also mandated the dismissal of' any strik-
ing municipal employee by a special commission empowered to receive charges against a
striker from any person. See e.g. id, Proposition B; GERR Ref. File 51:1439. Most jurisdictions
allow only the employer to move affirmatively to dismiss a striking employee or to enjoin a
strike, thus effectively leaving strike ban enforcement to the changing currents of collective
bargaining. See, e.g. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c.150E, §9A(G) (1973). But cf. New York's Taylor
Law, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210-2(g) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (mandates an automatic deduc-
tion of two day's pay for each day on strike). The experience of New York and San Francisco
illustrate further the role of hostile political and adverse economic forces in the redefinition
process.
23 N.Y. Etme, LAW 2576 (McKinney 1976).
24 Although the legislature's action was held to be valid in Board of Educ. v. City of
New York, 41 N.Y.2d 535, 362 N.E.2d 948, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1977), after a prolonged court
challenge, the Court of Appeals held that it could not consider the possibility of conflict with
provisions of the Financial Emergency Act because the Emergency Financial Control Board
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utilize the political process in securing gains, and in countering the political
power of opposing interest groups.
In all, the changing economic and political atmosphere surrounding
public sector bargaining in the last two or three years has produced severe
dislocations in the scope and process of bargaining in many areas of the
country. Some of the changes effected may be ill-conceived and short-lived.
However, the reaction has highlighted the underlying political conflict
which propels the ongoing process of redefining public sector bargaining in
a way that may produce permanent changes.
C. The Strike Ban and The Absence
of Impasse Resolution Procedures
A third element which must be factored into the reappraisal and re-
definitional process is the ongoing debate over the proper "mechanism" to
produce finality in public employee collective bargaining. In the relatively
early period of public sector bargaining, up to about 1970, the major struc-
tural effort to resolve the underlying political conflict so as to limit the
power of public employee unions focused on banning the right to strike."
Most jurisdictions still prohibit strikes by public employees. Thus, while the
strike in the private sector performs the necessary function of bringing
pressure to bear on both parties to resolve their disputes, the absence of ef-
fective procedures to bring bargaining disputes to an end has been a major
problem in public sector bargaining.
Recent experience has questioned the legitimacy of the strike ban as a
means of limiting public employee power so as to resolve the conceptual
conflict over the role of collective bargaining in the political process. On
the one hand, the strike ban has been generally ineffective. Public
employees enjoy a de facto right to strike nearly as effective as the legal
right," although the recent reaction to public . employee bargaining may
have sparked renewed interest in enforcing the strike ban. 27 On the other
was not a party to the proceeding. Therefore, it did not grant the mandamus relief specifically
requested, but instead remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. 41 N.Y.2d at
545, 362 N.E.2d at 955, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
25
 For a partial list of the voluminous literature on the theoretical aspects of the strike
ban, see R. SMITH. H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, JR., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
684-85 n.l (1974) [hereinafter SMITH, EDWARDS & CLARK].
Not all commentators have urged that strikes be prohibited. See Burton & Krider, The
Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 440 (1970).
" See Edwards, The Impact of Private Sector Principles in the Public Sector: Bargaining Rights
for Supervisors and the Duty to Bargain, IN UNION POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 51, 66 (D. Lipsky,
ed. 1975) [hereinafter Edwards); Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 678, 681 n.14 (1976) [hereinafter Grodinl.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the number of work stoppages in the pub-
lic sector rose sharply in 1975 to 478 from only 384 in the previous year. GERR No. 694, at
18 (Feb. 7, 1977). Even in states like New York and Massachusetts, which enforce the strike
proscription with some vigor, strikes are not an infrequent occurrence. Indeed, so common
are teachers' strikes in New York that the School Administrators Association recently con-
ducted a series of strike seminars to teach principals of schools how to deal with the problems
which strikes cause. GERR No. 712, at 19 (June 13, 1977). However, in-the fall of 1976,
teachers' strikes in 16 states fell from 109 the previous year to 66, 32 of which were in
Pennsylvania, where strikes are legal. GERR No. 676, at D-1 (Sept. 27, 1976).
" For instance, the Missouri Supreme Court took an interesting approach to strike en-
forcement by declaring that agreements resulting from an illegal strike are completely void
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hand the strike, legal or not, may not be as frightening a weapon as it once
was perceived to be. Although the strike is still an effective economic
weapon, the awesome mystery which initially clothed public sector strikes
has worn off:
Employers in the public sector increasingly perceive the
strike with less emotion and, indeed, many are now willing to ac-
cept strikes as an alternative not only to compulsory and binding
arbitration, but also though less frequently to the standard public
sector mandated impasse procedures.
For a period of time the employers' perception of the strike
was that it was tantamount to anarchy. That perception ... is
fading .... 29
Moreover, inconvenienced constituencies no longer clamor for settle-
ment at any cost: "Unless public health or safety are threatened, the tax-
payer is inclined to greet the strike with apathy and indifference — an at-
titude which brings little pressure on the public employer." 29 Some public
employers even see strikes as a cost-saving device in times of fiscal crisis,
when service in non-essential employment areas can be sacrificed. 3° Addi-
tionally, replacements are easy to find when unemployment is high. In
sum, public employers may prefer in certain situations to face a strike
rather than grant a costly settlement or accede to binding interest arbitra-
tion in which they lose decision-making control." Even the unions have
begun to reassess the utility of the strike as a pressure device. 32
This evidence, which questions the effectiveness of strikes in the pub-
lic sector as well as the necessity for strike bans, is encouraging reappraisal
of that means of limiting union power in order to resolve the underlying
and unenforceable in the courts even if the public employer "ratifies" the agreement by acting
in accord with it. St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 544 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo. 1976).
28 Helsby, Has Government Preempted Collective Bargaining!," Address to Society of Pro-
fessionals in Dispute Resolution, Toronto (Oct. 25, 1976), reprinted in, GERR No. 681, at F-1,
F-a (Nov. 1, 1976) [hereinafter Helsby]. Mr. Helsby is chairman of the New York PERB.
" Id. Helsby's assessment may even be too cautious. The San Francisco voters unleashed
a vicious response to public employee strikes, see note 22 supra, after the craft and transport
unions surrendered following a one month long strike in March and April, 1976. See RASKIN,
supra note 19, at 207-08. Berkeley endured a 25-day firefighters strike in 1975. The terms of
settlement were said to be closer to that of the city's position. See Grodin, supra note 26, at 700
n.76.
30 See Helsby, supra note 28, at F-3.
It has been reported that the salary savings resulting from the recent teachers strike in
Buffalo, New York, Financed the pay raise resulting from that strike. GERR No. 692, at 14
(Jan. 24, 1977).
" See Helsby, supra note 28, at F-3. Another commentator argues that prohibiting public,
employees from striking is not sound policy because alternatives such as interest arbitration
may be too expensive. Lewin, Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike, in RATHER, supra note
19, at 145. Lewin feels that strikes ought to be treated simply as "... events whose conse-
quences must be weighed against other bargaining outcomes." Id. at 163.
32 On the other side of the coin, unions are beginning to reassess their previous
contention that the strike is the so-called "equalizer" at the table; that the right to
strike is an essential ingredient of collective bargaining; that the strike and the
threat of a strike are the only way to receive equity from their public employer.
- In short, the strike, in most situations, has not proved to be the pressure device
and the equalizer that it was expected to be .... The result is that many unions
are beginning to push for some form of statutory arbitration.
Helsby, supra note 28, at F-3.
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political conflict. The number of jurisdictions permitting public employees
to strike is slowly growing. 33
 Given the de facto right to strike which results
from the procedural barriers preventing enforcement of the strike ban,
policymakers cannot rely on the strike prohibition to allow a broader scope
of bargaining. 34
 In public sector jurisdictions which continue to ban strikes,
the absence of strike-induced pressure to settle bargaining disputes
heightens the need for effective alternative means of impasse resolution, if
only to remove the incentive to strike.
In response to the need for impasse resolution procedures; legisla-
tures are providing, and the parties to bargaining have made greater use
of, nonbinding procedures such as mediation and fact-finding. 36
 The virtue
of a nonbinding procedure is that the parties can participate with less fear
that the final decision is being taken from their hands. Taxpayers present
less resistance because the procedures hardly distort the political process at
all. However, nonbinding procedures tend to continue interminably with-
out resolution. Thus, in jurisdictions where the idea of public employees
striking remains politically unacceptable, despite questions concerning the
legitimacy of the strike prohibition, compulsory, binding forms of resolu-
tion are needed.
Quite a few jurisdictions have recognized the need for binding resolu-
tion of bargaining disputes at least in the area of "essential services." In re-
cent years the number of jurisdictions allowing either party to demand
binding interest arbitration in non-essential services has been growing
slowly but steadily. 36
 However, efforts to compel binding arbitration have
been subject to intense political opposition" and in many states to constitu-
33
 Strikes are now permitted in Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota (but only if the public em-
ployer does not agree to binding arbitration), Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in KNAPP, supra note 15, at 81, 99
n.114• The home rule city of Eugene,•Oregon recently decided to allow strikes as well as bind-
ing arbitration. GERR No. 687, at B-9 (Dec. 13, 1976).
Model legislation drafted by the National Public Employer Labor Relations Association
includes a provision allowing strikes. GERR No. 673, at B-9 (Sept. 6, 1976); GERR Ref. File
51:181.
34
 Michigan, for instance, has allowed a wide scope of mandatory bargaining in reliance
on the strike prohibition. Cf. Westwood Community Schools, 1972 MERC LAB. Op. 313, re-
printed in SMITH, EDWARDS & CLARK, supra note 25, at 397, 401-02. Yet MERC and the Michi-
gan courts have thrown so many procedural roadblocks into the enforcement scheme that
employees may strike with little fear of sanction. Edwards, supra note 26, at 54.
34
 For example, when the first round of negotiations for state employees under the new
bargaining statute in Massachusetts resulted in a strike, the Labor Relations Commission
sought and received an injunction order that compelled the parties to mediate the dispute.
Massachusetts and Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU, 3 MASS. LAB. REL. REP. 2 (1976).
Although still opposed to public sector bargaining, the American Association of School
Administrators recently proposed a model bargaining statute for jurisdictions where the issue
is being considered. The model statute would mandate mediation 1n the event of impasse,
allow fact-finding, but not allow binding arbitration. GERR No. 689, at 14 (Jan. 3, 1977). For
recent legislation establishing or improving nonbinding impasse procedures, see e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276 (West 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN, 41.58 (1975).
"See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-473, 7-474 (West 1976) (municipal employees);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-11 (Burns Supp. 1976); IowA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West Supp. 1976);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 150E, § 9 (West Supp. 1976) (essential employees); N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW 209(4)(o) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (essential employees). For an exhaustive list of legisla-
tion providing for binding interest arbitration, see Grodin, supra note 26, at 678-79 n.2.
37
 Binding arbitration in New York and Massachusetts narrowly survived intense politi-
cal opposition when the original statutes expired in June of 1977. Governor Carey of New
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tional challenges. 38 The concern is that politically unaccountable, private
individuals are deciding public policy issues, issues which have a major im-
pact on the level of taxes and services. Accordingly, interest arbitration has
been challenged as a subversion of the representative legislative function
and the one-person, one-vote principle.
These constitutional arguments advanced against binding arbitration
suggest the presence of the same political conflict that underlies the other
structural attempts to limit the influence of collective bargaining on the
normal political process: fear that arbitration, like the right to strike or ex-
pansion of the scope of bargaining, will institutionalize public employee
power and, by removing issues from the political arena, will create substan-
tial and permanent disadvantages to competing groups in the political pro-
cess. For example, judicial decisions in two states upholding the constitu-
tionality of compulsory interest arbitration only by an evenly divided vote
suggest an extraordinary level of concern with the scope of bargaining. In
York attempted to make arbitration awards subject to local legislative approval in order to en-
hance the political accountability of binding arbitration. The effort was ultimately defeated.
Governor Dukakis of Massachusetts actually vetoed the bill extending the arbitration statute
but the veto was overridden. GERR No. 716, at 13 (July II, 1977). Acts of 1977, ch. 347,
amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, C. 150E §4. The new law includes more detailed "ability to
pay" criteria, including consideration of existing property tax burdens. Id.
In November, 1977, Massachusetts amended the binding arbitration provisions of its
collective bargaining statute by creating a thirteen member Joint Labor-Management Commit-
tee. The committee is empowered to enter a contract dispute and decide whether an impasse
exists, which points in negotiation should go to arbitration, and who should arbitrate. Acts of
1977, ch. 730, amending MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. c. 150E, § 1. See also GERR No. 687, at B-1, B-7
and E-1 (Dec. 20, 1976) (describing a conference on binding arbitration in New York and a
report on experiences and recommendations).
38 State courts have struck down municipal or county provisions providing for binding
interest arbitration as unconstitutional delegations of authority delegated to elected officials by
the state legislature. Bagley v. Manhattan Beach, 18 Ca1,3d 24, 553 P.2d 1140, 132 Cal. Rpm
668 (1976); Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley,_Colo._, 553 P.2d 790 (1976);
Classified Employees Ass'n v. Anderson, GERR No. 687, at B-15 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1976). State
courts have similarly struck down state legislative provisions. Sioux Falls v. Firefighters, Local
234 N.W,2d 35 (1975); Salt Lake City v. Firelighters Local 1645,—Utah_,
563 P.2d 786 (1977).
State courts have upheld the constitutionality of binding interest arbitration when pro-
vided for either by a home rule city, Firefighters Local 1186 v. Vallejo, 12 Cat.3d 608, 526
P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rpir. 507 (1974), or by state legislative provisions, Biddeford v. Biddeford
Educ. Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 403 (Me. 1973) (Wernick, J., separate opinion) (split vote); Ar-
lington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2035, 352 N.E.2d 914;
Firefighters Union v. Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975) (Williams, J., separate
opinion) (split vote); Orleans Educ. Ass'n v, School Dist. of Orleans, 193 Neb. 675, 229
N.W.2d 172 (1975); Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404
(1975) (see the concurring opinion by Justice Fuchsberg answering substantive due process
problems); Harney v, Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 155 A.2d 560 (1969) (amendment to the state con-
stitution); Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969)
(performance by the arbitration panel of a public function, making the arbitrator a public of-
ficer, removed the delegation problem); Spokane v, Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash.2d 457,
553 P.2d 1316 (1976); Firefighters Local 946 v. Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968) (panel was
held to be performing an executive, not a legislative function). The courts of Massachusetts
and New York, supra, were quick to point out to the citizens of Arlington and Amsterdam re-
spectively, that the arbitration legislation in each state would expire in June of 1977 and any
complaints should be addressed to the legislature. See also 01.., ATr. GEN. or TEXAS No. H-965
(March 29, 1977), concluding that Texas' binding arbitration statute is constitutional. GERR
No. 707, at 14 (May 9. 1977).
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Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 39 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine barely allowed compulsory arbitration for municipal employees to
stand, when the school board challenged the law as an unconstitutional del-
egation of lawmaking power by the legislature. Ultimately, the deciding fac-
tor appears to have been the view that statutory exclusions from arbitration
of "educational policies" and of monetary items such as salaries, pensions
and insurance benefits provided a primary standard or intelligible principle
guiding the exercise of arbitral discretion." Arbitral consideration of the
underlying conflict between public policy and working interests, guided by
legislative and judicial exclusions of items considered to be too politically
sensitive to entrust to binding arbitration, overcame objections that an ar-
bitrator who was not politically accountable was entrusted with legislative
functions.''
On a similar constitutional challenge to compulsory interest arbitra-
tion, the Michigan Supreme Court also focused on the allegedly illegal del-
egation of legislative functions. in Dearborn Fire Fighters Union v. Dearborn,'"
the key issue for the court appeared to be "... the power of the [arbi-
trator], who does not have continuing responsibility, to make critical choices
on economic and noneconomic issues without political accountability.""
One justice was moved by the fact that under the rare circumstances of the
case the arbitrator was close enough to the elective process to swing the
balance to the side of constitutionality." The city's refusal to participate in
arbitration had led to the appointment of a neutral arbitrator by the
chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) who
was himself appointed by the governor. Had the arbitrator not been ap-
pointed by a politically accountable official — had the arbitral process fol-
lowed the normal statutory course — the arbitral award probably would
have been struck down as unconstitutional."
32 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973).
4 ° Id. at 414 (Wernick, J., separate opinion).
" The arbitrators will be obliged to bear in mind that (I) the legislature deemed
"educational policies" to involve value choices so fundamental that binding de-
cisions concerning them should be made essentially unilaterally and by persons
directly responsible to the people and (2) for this•reason, even though the arbi-
trators might reasonably believe a concrete item to embody a sufficient measure
of the features of "working conditions" to overbalance an admixture of "educa-
tional policy"—thereby warranting a conclusion that the subject-matter is to be
classified as "working conditions" ... subject to binding arbitrational de-
terminations ...—the arbitrators must acknowledge the continuing importance of
such generalized interests of the citizenry in the overall domain of education as
might be relevantly in play. The arbitrators must balance the impacts of such
"educational policy" overlays as inhere in fact (even though they might not have
been sufficient to require that the subject matter ... be totally excluded from ...
binding arbitration) against the weight of the "working conditions" interests of
the teachers ....
Id.
" 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975).
43 1d. at 270, 231 N.W.2d at 242 (Levin, J.,•separate opinion) (would hold compulsory
arbitration unconstitutional).
"Id. at 314-15, 231 N.W.2d at 267-68 (Williams, J., separate opinion) (would hold
compulsory arbitration constitutional).
"The statutory process for selecting the neutral arbitrator in Michigan has since been
amended so as to give MERC a more permanent role in the selection of the neutral arbitrator.
MIC1-t. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.235 (1976 Supp.).
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The Michigan Supreme Court did not feel compelled to exclude any
items from arbitration as had been done in Maine. However, those justices
who would have held compulsory arbitration to be unconstitutional were
concerned that conditions of employment subject to mandatory bargaining
and arbitration had been defined so broadly by MERC and the courts that
hot political issues might be resolved in arbitration rather than "in the halls
of local and state legislatures." 4" The Michigan Court, which had in several
cases prior to Dearborn allowed a wide scope of bargaining, suddenly
seemed to be concerned that arbitrators might grant awards in areas which
would hinder political tradeoffs..' Although the controversy in both the
Maine and Michigan cases arose at the arbitration award enforcement
stage, both courts made clear their concern with the scope of bargaining is-
sues and its potential effect on the political process.
What becomes clear from the controversy surrounding compulsory
arbitration — evaluated in light of the continuing conceptual political con-
flict and the existing political and economic climate — is that the real prob-
lem is not the political accountability of the decisionmaker but of the deci-
sion itself. The remedy is not to declare binding arbitration un-
constitutional. Rather, the remedy is to define the scope of bargaining so as
to ensure the political accountability of important public policy decisions. If
a decision involves political choices which should not be isolated in collec-
tive bargaining to the exclusion of other affected groups' the decision
should be subject neither to binding agreement nor to binding determina-
tion by an arbitrator. Legislatures and courts should be facing these def-
initional problems at the scope of bargaining stage. Refinements at this ear-
lier level would help to alleviate the overdetermined political opposition to
strikes or interest arbitration, overdetermined because of unresolved politi-
cal concerns which lead to mistrust of the results of collective bargaining."
Thus, if political concerns were dealt with at the scope of bargaining level it
might be easier to accept strikes and compulsory arbitration less as a distor-
tion of the political process and more as merely a structural means of assur-
ing the smooth functioning of collective bargaining in the public sector."
" 394 Mich, at 266-67, 231 N.W.2d at 240 (Levin, J., separate opinion).
" Justice Levin noted that any provision relating to work rules, workload and safety was
subject to mandatory bargaining in Michigan. If the arbitrator were to make an award in the
area of manning levels because of concern with safety and workload, the public employer
might be precluded from reducing or freezing the level of the work force in order to effect
budgetary savings. Id. at 265-67, 231 N.W.2d 239-40. See discussion of negotiability of staffing
and manning levels, text at notes 154-62 infra.
The Michigan experience amply illustrates the point. In Dearborn, Justice Levin com-
plained that arbitration panels might decide whether to impose residency requirements, "a
manifestly legislative-political question." 394 Mich. at 265, 231 N.W.2d at 239 (footnote omit-
ted). Yet his remarks during oral argument of the case in which residency requirements were
held to be a mandatory subject indicated no such concern. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v.
Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 60.61, 214 N.W.2d 803, 811 (1974).
'° Apart from conceptual and political problems underlying scope of bargaining de-
terminations, one functional problem in public sector bargaining has been the absence in
many jurisdictions of administrative agencies with the expertise necessary both to apply what-
ever scope of bargaining standards exist and to assist in dispute resolution. Most courts do not
have the expertise to make scope of bargaining determinations on first impression. To assist
the smooth functioning of the bargaining process many jurisdictions recently have established
administrative agencies or expanded the functions of existing agencies so as to oversee the
bargaining process from organization of employees through bargaining and dispute resolu-
tion. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T Coiw § 3548 (West 1976) (establishing Educational Employment Re-
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The following sections of this article will examine past and present
approaches to resolving structurally the scope of bargaining issues. Because
it has been suggested that refinements at this earlier level more appropri-
ately resolve the underlying and unanswered political conflicts, the article
will proceed by examining the early definitions of the scope of bargaining
as well as the recent redefinitional responses, with special emphasis given to
the role of permissive subjects of bargaining where used. After these bar-
gaining trends have been appraised, a model for determining negotiability
of bargaining issues, which does not contain a permissive category, will be
set out and explored.
II. INITIAL DEFINITIONS OF THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING
A. The Scope of Bargaining
Scope of bargaining questions were relatively rare in the early period
of public sector bargaining. Increasingly, the focus of controversy over the
proper role of collective bargaining in the political process has shifted from
the strike issue to the attempt to limit the scope of bargaining. 54 Three
problems were apparent in the earliest attempts to define scope of bargain-
ing in public employment. First, the initial definitional approaches were
subject to continual shifts in the resolution of the underlying political con-
flict as acceptance of public sector bargaining and the relative power of
public employee unions ebbed and flowed. Second, the initial approaches
were themselves not always clearly defined by the legislature. PER Bs, where
they existed, and courts had to free-lance in the case-by-case application of
often very general legislative standards. Where the results of their efforts
did not fit the original or shifting legislative intent, changes took place.
Third, careful definition of the scope of bargaining has been hampered in
many jurisdictions by the absence of administrative agencies with collective
bargaining expertise. Even where such agencies exist, scope of bargaining
issues may be deflected to the courts when public employees seek judicial
lations Board); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276 (West Supp. 1977) (extending coverage to state
employees in 1975); INn. ConE ANN. § 22-6-4-10 (Burns Stipp. 1976) (extending coverage of
education employment relations board to all public employees in 1975); IOWA ConE ANN. §
20.5 (West Supp. 1976) (establishing Iowa PERB in 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§
3, 4, 9, 9A and 11 (West Stipp, 1976) (broadening functions of existing commission and ex-
tending to state employees in 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §34;13A-5.4 (West 1975) (establishing in
1975 a commission with exclusive power to render negotiability determinations); WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 41, § 58.010 (Supp. 1975) (creating public employment relations commission in
1975). But even if the jurisdiction has established an administrative agency with responsibility
for resolving negotiability questions, the agency may never see the question. Most PERBs are
equipped to handle negotiability questions only in a refusal to bargain proceeding. Thus, the
agency mostly will see questions regarding the scope of mandatory negotiations. If instead
agreement has been reached and the union is attempting to enforce the agreement in arbitra-
tion or in court, the negotiability question evades the PERB altogether. Accordingly there is a
need for expedited procedures whereby the courts can defer negotiability questions to the
PERB.
5° Although William Kilberg was able to state accurately in 1970 that "Where has
been relatively little litigation over the scope of bargaining in public employ-
ment," [Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Government Labor Re-
lations, 30 Mn. L. REV. 179, 189 (1970)1, in the ... years since Kilberg's article
there has been a virtual onslaught of litigation.
Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in KNAPP supra note 15, at 82.
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enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.
Most jurisdictions that have collective bargaining legislation for public
employees have taken a two step approach to defining the scope of bar-
gaining. The first step is to determine the issues over which the public em-
ployer is legally permitted to negotiate to binding agreement. Questions as
to the public employer's authority to negotiate a particular issue and as to
the enforceability or binding effect of agreement as to that issue have come
to be treated as one and the same. 51 In jurisdictions which do not. have col-
lective bargaining legislation establishing a duty to bargain this is the only
scope of bargaining determination that is made."
In jurisdictions that mandate collective bargaining over some issues,
questions concerning negotiability and enforceability have only been the
stepping stone to the next scope concern. Most jurisdictions, with varying
degrees of precision, attempt to distinguish "mandatory" subjects over
which bargaining to the point of impasse may be required by either side
from "permissive" subjects over which either side, usually the public em-
ployer, need not bargain. The discretion granted to employers in the pri-
vate sector to decide whether to bargain over a permissive issue is designed
to preserve a core area of managerial concern for unilateral decision when
so desired by the private employer. The judicially or legislatively created
permissive category in the public sector is designed to preserve discretion
over seemingly similar concerns. Yet the existence of a permissive category
may not be justifiable in the public sector. Discretion to make unilateral de-
cisions should be designed to protect collective political choices. Merely
allowing the public employer discretion to decide whether to bargain over
politically sensitive allocational or ideological issues may not adequately pro-
tect those choices."
B. Definitional Approaches to
Negotiability and Enforceability
In jurisdictions that required bargaining over any issues, there
evolved three general approaches to determine whether the public em-
" But y: Boston Teachers Union v. School Comm., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515, 350
N.E.2d 707 discussed in text at notes 137-40 infia.
as
	 cases cited at notes 99-100 infra.
"See text and notes 133-34 infra. The permissive category has been statutorily elimi-
nated in only two jurisdictions where collective bargaining over at least some conditions or
employment is required. In Hawaii, and very recently in California fur teachers but for no
other public employees, an issue must be bargained if either side insists or if it cannot be bar-
gained at all. See HAW. Rio:. S'rxr. § 89-9(a) (1975). This act requires negotiations over wages,
hours and conditions of employment but § 89.9(d) bars any agreement which would interfere
with the rights of a public employer to direct .employees; determine qualifications and stan-
dards for work; hire, promote, transfer, assign and retain employees or discipline employees
for proper cause; reduce staff size for legitimate reasons; maintain efficiency of governmental
operations; and determine the methods, means, and personnel of operating. See CAL. Gov-r
CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West 1976) (effective July 1, 1976). This act (the "Rodda" Act) spe-
cifically enumerates the scope of mandatory negotiations to include, in addition to wages and
hours, such items as class size, evaluation and grievance procedures, safety, and transfer
policies. All matters not specifically enumerated, "may not be a subject of meeting and
negotiating," although the public employer may consult on all matters, particularly "the defini-
tion of educational objectives, the determination of the content of courses and curriculum,
and the selection of textbooks ,"Id. at § 3543.2. The Winton Act of 1965, CAn.. Enuc. CODE
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ployer had legal authority to negotiate to binding agreement over a particu-
lar issue. 54
 The three approaches differed in the extent to which negotiabil-
ity or enforceability of an agreement was deemed to be limited by existing
enactments which either established statutory procedures for the resolution
of the issue or expressly or implicitly granted power over the resolution of
the issue to particular public agencies or officials. 55
The first approach provided that collective bargaining legislation
would govern in the event of conflict with existing legislation. For example,
in Michigan, one of the first states to adopt pervasive legislation governing
public sector bargaining, the state's highest court saw fit in 1971 to contour
the preexisting statutes to the collective bargaining framework where the
bargaining statute was silent as to the effect of preexisting legislation. In
Civil Service Commission v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors," the court held
that the earlier civil service statute allowing counties to establish procedures
for determining conditions of employment was impliedly repealed to the
extent of any repugnancy with the later bargaining statute." The scope of
bargaining in Michigan thereby received no more restrictive an interpreta-
tion on account of existing statutes than the bargaining statute might itself
be interpreted to authorize.
§§ 13080-13090 (West 1975), replaced by the Rodda Act, provided only for consultation on all
matters within the discretion of the public school employer.
Indiana may have eliminated the permissive category. The bargaining statute, not effec-
tive until 1976, mandates the conventional duty to bargain over wages, hours, and conditions
of employment. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22.6-4-I(k), 22-6-4-2 (Burns Supp, 1976). The statute con-
tains a fairly conventional management rights clause, reserving to the employer the "re-
sponsibility and authority to manage and direct ... the operations and activities of the public
agency," including the right to direct employees; establish policy; hire, promote, demote,
transfer, assign, retain, or discipline employees; and maintain the efficiency of public opera-
tions. Id. at § 22-6-4-3. Tucked away in 22-6-4-13 is the admonition that "[a] contract may
not include provisions in conflict with ... any right or benefit established by ... state law; [or)
public employer rights as defined in [§ 22-6-4-3]."
54 Negotiability questions may arise in the context of suits for a declaration of authority
to negotiate, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282
N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S,2d 17 (1972); suits to compel grievance arbitration, e.g., Dunellen
Board of Educ, v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973); suits to enforce or
vacate arbitration awards, e.g., Boston Teachers Union v. School Committee, 1976 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 1515, 350 N.E.2d 707; and other contract enforcement suits in the absence of arbitration.
55
 Some of the differences arise from different legislative expressions of the effect to be
given to legislative, municipal or administrative enactments which may conflict with the terms
of the bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Micn. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 et seq. (1976) and N.Y. CIV.
SERV. LAW §§ 200 et seq. (McKinney's Supp. 1976), both silent on the effect to be given to con-
flicting enactment and both interpreted to give collective bargaining a rather wide scope, see
text at notes 56-60 infra. The Massachusetts bargaining statute and the Connecticut municipal
employee bargaining statute both enumerate a limited number of enactments over which the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement shall prevail, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f)
(West Stipp. 1976) and MASS. GEN. Laws ANN. ch . 150E, § 7 (West Supp. 1976). See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 89-9(d) (1975), elaborating a range of issues over which bargaining is not allowed,
supra note 53, and Cm.. Gov-t' CODE § 3543.2 (West 1976), barring negotiation over all matters
not specifically enumerated, supra note 53. c f. WASH, REV. CODE ch. 41, § 59.910 (1976) (bar-
gaining statute and the terms of the collective bargaining agreement shall prevail when in•con-
flict with another statute, or a resolution, rule, policy or regulation of the employer). See also
text at notes 88-89 infra (New Jersey approach); text at note 94 infra (Minnesota approach);
text at notes 96-98 infra (Oregon approach); and text at notes 92.93 infra (Pennsylvania ap-
proach).
56
 384 Mich. 363, 184 N.W.2d 201 (1971).
57 1d. at 373-74, 184 N.W.2d at 204-05. The Michigan Supreme Court has since re-
treated slightly from this very expansive position. See text at note 91 infra.
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The second approach allowed the scope of bargaining permitted by
the bargaining statute to be limited by preexisting enactments but only by
express, specific statutory prohibitions. For example, in New York, another
of the early states to adopt an extensive framework for collective bargain-
ing in public employment, the Court of Appeals adopted this approach in
1972 in Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 3 v. Associated
Teachers of Huntington." The court in Huntington held that a public em-
ployer has authority to negotiate a provision if it falls within the definition
of terms or conditions of employment unless a specific statutory provision
"expressly" prohibits collective bargaining over that term. 59 Accordingly,
the court held negotiable a provision for binding arbitration of disciplinary
action pursuant to a just cause standard of substantive review, because
there was no statutory provision "expressly" prohibiting bargaining over
such an item. The court found that the negotiated grievance provision did
not supplant the existing tenure law provisions for hearing procedures
prior to disciplinary action. 6 ° Finding that the grievance procedure did not
and could not preclude a teacher's choice of other methods of statutory
appeal, the court allowed the statutory procedures and the bargained pro-
vision to stand side by side.
The third approach to negotiability determinations looked not just to
specific prohibitions but also to existing enactments or procedures as ex-
pressions of a policy that a particular issue be resolved in a certain way or
by a certain official. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, initially
carved a large section out of the range of subjects entrusted to bilateral
negotiations. In 1973 the court held in Dunellen Board of Education v. Dunel-
len Education Association," that the Board's decision to consolidate two de-
partments into one, thus eliminating one chairmanship, could not be sub-
ject to review under contractual grievance procedures culminating in bind-
ing arbitration. The court compared the very general terms of the duty to
bargain mandated in the bargaining statute" with the statutory re-
sponsibility vested in the Board by the Education Law to make de-
terminations of educational policy. The court found that "... the decision
to consolidate was predominantly a matter of educational pdlicy which had
... at most only remote and incidental effect, on the 'terms and conditions
of employment' ....""" Since the decision was a policy matter the contrac-
58 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S,2d 17 (1972).
52 Id, at 127, 130, 282 N.E.2d at 112, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 21, 23. The Board of Educa-
tion was held to have the authority to negotiate provisions providing for reimbursement both
for job-related property damage and for tuition for advanced studies; for a salary increment
in the last year of teaching before retirement; and for binding arbitration pursuant to a just
cause standard of any disciplinary action taken against tenured teachers.
The court considered the pre-dismissal hearing required by the tenure law to be a
prerequisite to the Board's decision to impose disciplinary action. Such action is itself a pre-
requisite to substantive review under the grievance provision, which was therefore supple-
Mentary, not conflicting. Id. at 131, 282 N.E.2d at 114, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
sr 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973).
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. 34;13A-5.3 (West 1974), mandating a duty to bargain over "terms
and conditions of employment." At the time of decision the bargaining statute provided that
no provision in the statute shall "... annul or modify any statute or statutes of this state." N.J.
STAT. ANN. 34:13A-8.1 (West 1974). Immediately after the Dunellen decision the legislature
amended the provision so as to grant priority over negotiated provisions only to pension stat-
utes. 1974 N.J. LAWS ch. 123, 6.
83 64 N.J. at 29, 311 A.2d at 743.
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tual grievance mechanism could not replace the responsibility of the Com-
missioner of Education to supervise policy determinations and resolve dis-
putes about such determinations arising under the school laws.
Dicta in Dunelien provided a significant surprise. The resignation of
one chairman before the decision to consolidate had eliminated the neces-
sity for the court in its holding to weigh educational policy interests against
the interests of the teacher in conditions of employment. Yet even if a
teacher had been dismissed the court expressed doubts that the affected
teacher could contest the decision under the contractual grievance proce-
dure. The court found that in the field of education long-standing statutes
specifically vested in the Commissioner of Education jurisdiction over con-
troversies relating to educational policy, including the demotion or dis-
missal of teachers. 64
 Accordingly, on that basis the Duneleen court indicated
that such statutes would predominate over contractual grievance proce-
dures culminating in binding arbitration on the same subject. Thus, while
the New York court in Huntington at least allowed binding arbitration
under the contract to exist alongside of statutory procedures for review,
the New Jersey court in Dunelien indicated that existing statutory proce-
dures would be given exclusive effect."
In sum, when determining whether a public employer had legal au-
thority to negotiate or enforce a binding agreement on a particular issue,
initial judicial decisions took one of three approaches: (1) that collective
bargaining statutes governed in cases of conflict with existing legislation, (2)
that the scope of bargaining permitted by the enabling statute could be lim-
ited only by an express, preexisting statutory provision, and (3) that even in
the absence of a specific prohibition in a preexisting statute, the statute
might express a policy requiring that a particular issue be resolved in a cer-
tain way. The scope of bargaining thus could be expanded or limited by
judicial decision, depending on which of the three approaches was taken.
"Id. at 28-29, 311 A.2d at 743.
"a The experience in Massachusetts in the early 1970's illustrates a corollary approach to
that adopted in Dunelien. The Supreme Judicial Court took the position that statutes granting
power to or imposing responsibility on particular public officials or agencies take precedence
over the results of collective bargaining. In Chief' of Police v. Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 258
N.E.2d 531 (1970), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the powers of a police chief' granted
by the "strong chief" statute, Mass. GEN. Laws ANN. ch. 41, 97A (West 1975), prevailed over
certain fairly traditional terms of collective bargaining, such as seniority preferences and
grievance procedures, in an agreement between the police officers and the town, 357 Mass. at
502, 258 N.E.2d at 537. Additionally, the court in Doherty v. School Committee, 363 Mass.
885, 297 N.E.2d 494 (1973), sustained an arbitration award granting back pay to a golf coach
who had not been reappointed but barred reinstatement since the superintendent retained
sole discretion under the school laws to initiate appointments. 363 Mass. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at
495.
The miscellaneous provisions which once governed municipal employee bargaining in
Massachusetts provided that a bargained provision was subordinated if in conflict with any
law, ordinance or by-law. MASS, GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, § 1781 (West 1971). After the institu-
tion of the action in Dracut, section 1781 was amended to provide that the terms of collective
bargaining agreements prevail over the regulations of police or fire chiefs. 1969 Mass. Acts ch.
341; 1970 Mass. Acts. ch, 340. After the decision in Doherty, Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 199, §
1781 (West 1971), was repealed in a complete overhaul of collective bargaining in Mas-
sachusetts, but the statutory conflict provision was preserved with some limitations on the pre-
cedence of conflicting enactments in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 7 (West Supp. 1976).
For recent decisions interpreting the statute as amended, see text at notes 113-15 and text at
notes 135-42 infra.
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C. The MandatorylPermissive Dichotomy
Many states chose to focus their efforts to limit the relative advantage
in the political process granted by collective bargaining to public employees
not by excluding sensitive policy issues from bargaining but by allowing the
public employer to decide whether to bargain over policy issues or manage-
rial prerogatives. These jurisdictions felt that accountability of the public
employer would act as a check on the employer's bargaining discretion.
The private sector definition of the mutual obligation of the employer
and employees to bargain in good faith over "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" served as a model for most public
sector bargaining legislation.° 6 Litigation in the private sector over the de-
finitions of wages and hours has been relatively straightforward." How-
ever, the attempt to define "conditions of employment" has engendered
confusion. In National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner," the Supreme Court stated for the first time that the obligation to
bargain is limited to those matters which come within the definition of
"conditions of employment:"" "As to ... matters [other than conditions of
66 Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). Cf.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070(2); § 23.40.250(1) (1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West 1968) (local
employees); CAL GOV'T CODE § 3529 (West 1973) (state employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
7-470(c) (West 1975) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-272(c) (West 1975)
(state employees); HAW. Rev. STAT. § 89-9(a) (1976); 1No. CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-1(k) (Burns
Supp. 1976); Mien. STAT. ANN. § 17-455(15) (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:I(XI); N.Y.
Civ. SERV. LAW § 201(4) (McKinney 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-09 (1969) (teachers); 43
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.701 (Purdon's Supp. 1976); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. ADMIN. CODE art.
Xl.A, § 16.201(16); WASH. REv, CODE ANN. § 41.56.030(4) (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN, §
I11.70(1)(d) (West 1973) (municipal employees). cf. with slight variations, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
447.203(14) (West Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 72-5413(g) (1972) (teachers); ME. REV. STAT, tit.
26, § 965(1)(C) (Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26 § 979p(E)(1) (1976)
(state employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 6 (West Stipp, 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
179.66(2) and 179.63(18) (West 1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-1603(1) and § 59-4605(3)
(Supp. 1975). Cf., with slightly more detail than in section 8(d), CODE, tit. 19, § 1301(c)
(1965); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650(7) (1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 111.91 (1971) (state
employees); and Wis. STA. '', ANN. § 111.91(1) (West 1971) (state employees). For very detailed
statements of mandatory subjects of bargaining, see CAI.. GovT CODE § 3543.2 (West 1976)
(public school employees); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-4 (Burns 1973) (educational employees);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 1974); KAN. STAT, § 75-4322(t) (Supp. 1976); and NEV. REV.
sTivr. § 288.150(2) (1975).
However, variations may have significant consequences. For instance, fbr teachers in
Connecticut the duty to bargain is defined "with respect to salaries and other conditions of
employment." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153e(d) (West Supp. 1976); see also MO. REV. STAT. §
105.520 (1969). The Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted the absence of any reference to
hours as an expression of legislative intent that as a matter of policy .school boards should not
be obligated to bargain over the school calendar and the length of the school day. West
Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 580, 295 A.2d 526, 534 (1972). For the
same result in other jurisdictions under different statutory language, see Biddeford v. Bid-
deford Educ. Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 421 (Me. 1973) (teaching hours and school calendar not
mandatory); Burlington County College Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 311 A.
2c1 733 (1973) (school calendar not mandatory). But cf. Westwood Community Schools, 1972
MERC LAB. OP. 313, reprinted in SMITH, EDWARDS AND CLARK, supra note 25, at 397 (school
calendar a mandatory subject); Board of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311
A.2d 729 (1973) (teaching hours are mandatory); Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 73
Wis.2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231. '240 (1976) (school calendar mandatory).
67 See GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw (1976) at 498-503 and cases cited therein,
" 356 U.S. '342 (1958).
" 9 id. at 349.
173
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
employment], each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree
or not to agree."'" Thus, while a party could not insist to the point of im-
passe on matters not encompassing terms or conditions of employment, the
parties would be permitted to bargain over such matters.
Although the scope of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA
primarily focuses on the term "conditions of employment" it is not limited
by the words of the statute alone. In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board," Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, spoke
of a range of managerial decisions
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions
concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic
scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about
conditions of employment .... If ... the purpose of section 8(d)
is to describe a limited area subject to the duty of collective bar-
gaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge
only indirectly upon [working conditions or] employment secu-
rity should be excluded from that area.I 2
Thus, Justice Stewart sketched out an area in which the need to preserve
managerial discretion over certain decisions collided with the policy favor-
ing collective bargaining as the means of resolving employment disputes.
Conditions of employment involving matters of vital concern to employees,
may be removed from bargaining because they are fundamental to the
basic direction of the enterprise. In public employment the concern for
preservation of the prerogative to make traditional managerial decisions is
to preserve important policy decisions for resolution in the political process.
Accordingly the area of overlap between conditions of employment and
fundamental management or policy decisions becomes that much more
crucial.
The preservation of managerial decision-making, which limits the
scope of mandatory bargaining in the private sector, has been defined judi-
cially and administratively. The words of the statute do not make such a
limitation explicit. In the public sector, some jurisdictions followed or ap-
proximated the loose private sector definition of the duty to bargain and
left to PERBs, if in existence, and to courts, the difficult question whether
to follow private sector precedent or to look to differences in public sector
bargaining in delineating an area of managerial decision-making exempt
from the duty to bargain.'" Other jurisdictions statutorily reserved certain
" For a similar expression in the public sector, see West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. De-
Courcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581, 295 A.2d 526, 535 (1972) ("Nevertheless, the phrase 'conditions
of employment' limits the area of negotiability.") But see CAL. GOVT CODE § 3529 (West 1973)
(scope of bargaining includes "but is not limited to" wages, hours, and conditions of employ-
ment.).
" 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
"Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring opinion).
"See, e.g., CAL. Gov't' CODE §§ 3526-3536 (West 1971) (state employees); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 et seq. (West Supp. 1976) (municipal employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
5-272(C) (West Stipp. 1976) (state employees); DEL CODE, tit. 19 §§ 1301 et seq. (1965); KAN.
STAT. §§ 72-5413 el seq. (1972) (teachers); ME. REV, STAT. tit. 26 969 (1973) (state employees);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1 et seq. (West Stipp. 1976); MICH. STAT, ANN. § 17.955
(1965); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 et seq. (1979); N.Y. C1•. SERV. LAW §§ 200 et seq. (McKinney's
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areas of management rights in which the public employer could not be re-
quired to bargain, although still leaving to courts and PERBs the task of de-
lineating the legislated standards in case-by-case application." A limited
number of jurisdictions listed those issues subject to mandatory negotia-
tions."
Since any particular issue can involve elements both of managerial or
public policy and of conditions of employment, the lack of specificity in
most definitions of the duty to bargain led courts and PERBs to search the
statutes for expressions of legislative intent concerning particular items.
Such expressions, if capable of interpretation, weighed heavily in scope of
bargaining decisions." Failing such illuminating expressions, PERBs and
courts began to attempt to apply various standards for comparing the im-
pact of an issue on managerial prerogatives and public policy with the im-
pact on conditions of employment. The standards would vary according to
the decision-making body's view of the proper balancing of competing pub-
lic sector interests and the factors taken into account in applying the stan-
dard adopted."
Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 243.650 et seq. (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 36-11-1 et seq. (1970)
(state); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.4-1 et seq. (1967) (teachers).
14 See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.250(7) (1976) (terms and conditions of employment do not
include "the general policies describing the functions and purposes of a public employer");
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504 (West 1968) (excepting consideration of merits, necessity or organiza-
tion of service provided by local employees); FLA. STAT. ANN, § 447.209 (West Supp, 1976) (re-
serving unilateral right to determine purpose; set standards of services; exercise discretion
over organization and operations; and direct and discipline employees); INt), CODE ANN. §
22-6-4-9 (Burns Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.7 (West 1974) (reserving exclusive power,
duty and right to determine and implement methods, means, assignments and personnel by
which public operations are to be conducted); KAN. STAT. § 75.4326 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1) (1973) (reserving educational policies); MINN. STAT. ANN, § 179.66
(West 1973) (excepting from mandatory bargaining "matters of inherent managerial policy,"
including functions and programs of' the employer, overall budget, utilization of' technology,
organizational structure, and selection, direction and number of' personnel); Movr, REV.
CODES ANN. § 59-1603 (Supp. 1975); NEv. REV. STAT. § 288.150(3) (1975) (reservation includes
right to determine staffing levels, work performance standards, workload factors, quality and
quantity of services to be offered, and means and methods of offering services); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 273-A (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8 (1965); PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101. 702 (I'urdun Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN, § 3-18-15.4 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.90 (West 1971) (state employees). See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-9(d) (1968),
In one instance, however, the management rights clause has been interpreted as simply
a codification of private sector precedent. See Firefighters Local 1186 v, Vallejo, 12 Cal.3d
608, 614, 526 P.2d 971, 976-77, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512-13 (1974).
" INU. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-4 (Burns 1973) (salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage
related fringe benefits); town CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 1974); KAN. STAT. 75-4322(t) (Supp.
1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150(2) (1975). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West 1976).
7" See Los Angeles County Dept. of Pub. Social Services and Dept. of Personnel, Case
No. UFC 55.3 (1971), reprinted in SMITH, EDWARDS, and CLARK, supra note 25, at 454, 456-57
(report adopted by Board of Supervisors found to be expression of intent that caseload be
mandatorily negotiable); National Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 751-53, 512
P.2d 426, 434-35 (1973) (legislative rejection both of proposed mandatory bargaining over all
"matters of mutual concern" and of proposed mandatory bargaining limited to economic con-
ditions of employment found to be determinative); West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v, DeCourcy,
162 Conn. 566, 580, 295 A.2d 526, 534 (1972) (elimination of "hours" from statutory defini-
tion of duty to bargain held to express legislative intent that school board not be required to
bargain over school calendar and length of school day).
77 In applying the standards adopted or in the absence of' any standard, PERBs and
courts have looked for guidance ...
(1) to whether bargaining over the matter is already a common practice,
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The significant relationship standard was perhaps the earliest test to
be adopted by PERBs. The standard was borrowed from the private sector
where it was first used in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board's to determine when an issue tinged with elements of manage-
rial policy would be considered to be a mandatory bargaining subject. In
the Westinghouse case the Fourth Circuit stated:
[S]ince practically every managerial decision has some impact
on wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, the . de-
termination of which decisions are mandatory bargaining sub-
jects must depend on whether a given subject has a significant or
material relationship to wages, hours, or other conditions of
employment."
Under this test issues bearing a significant relationship to wages, hours, and
e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn, 566, 584, 295 A.2d 526,
536, 537 (1972); Board of Education a. Associated Teachers (Huntington), 30 N.Y. 2d
at 128, 282 N.E.2d at 112-13, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 122;
(2) to federal precedent in the private sector, e.g., Firefighters Local 1186
v. Vallejo, 12 CaI.3d 608, 615-17, 526 P.2d 971, 976-77, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507,
512-13 (1974); Kerrigan v. Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 27, 278 N.E.2d 387, 390
(1972); Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 53, 214 N.W.2d 803, 808
(1974); but cf. National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512
P.2d 426, 435 (1973) (federal precedent not controlling because of differences
between private sector and public sector bargaining); West lrondequoit Teachers
Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 50, 315 N.E.2d 775, 777, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722
(1974); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School Dist.,
461 Pa. 494, 499-500, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975);
(3) to the existence or absence of a strike prohibition, e.g., Westwood
Community Schools, 1972 MERC LAB. OP. 313, reprinted in Ssirrii, EDWARDS &
CLARK, supra note 25, at 397, 402 (strike prohibition allows broader scope of
mandatory bargaining); Teamsters Local 320 v. Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 414,
225 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1975) (same);
(4) to the availability of binding impasse procedures, e.g., Biddeford v.
Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); see also Grodin, supra note
26, at 695-98. Many arbitration provisions exclude otherwise mandatory issues
from interest arbitration, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 97-D (1974) (salaries, pen-
sions and insurance excluded); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1976) (wages).
But cf. Firefighters Local 1186 v. Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 614 n.5, 526 P.2d 971,
975 n.5, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 511 n.5 (1974) (scope of mandatory bargaining and
scope of interest arbitration are the same); School Comm. of Boston v. Boston
Teachers Union Local 66, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1069, 1075-76, 363 N.E.2d 485,
488-89 (1977) (even matters outside the scope of mandatory bargaining may be
submitted to voluntary interest arbitration if mandatory items are also in dis-
pute);
(5) to the effect on other interest groups of bargaining over an issue, e.g.,
Board of Higher Educ., 7 PERK 3028 (1974), quoted in Clark, supra note 33, at 96,
discussed at note 167 infra.
Reference to bargaining practices, private sector precedent, and the existence of a strike pro-
hibition tends to broaden the scope of mandatory bargaining. Concern with the availability of
binding arbitration and with protecting affected interest groups tends to restrict the scope of
mandatory bargaining. Clark rightly argues that only the need to resolve some issues in the
public arena because of the effect on other interest groups should be considered in scope of
bargaining determinations. Clark, supra note 33, at 95-99. However, the best way to preserve
meaningful participation by other interest groups, when necessary, is to eliminate the permis-
sive category and redesign present standards used for determining negotiability. See text at
notes 131-48 infra.
78 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1966).
79 Id. at 548.
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other conditions of employment, despite elements of managerial policy, are
presumptively mandatory subjects of bargaining. It is not necessary to show
that the impact on conditions of employment is heavier than or even as
weighty as the policy or management elements involved in order for the
subject of concern to be considered to be. mandatory. Rather, all that is
necessary is to demonstrate the significant relationship between the issue
sought to be bargained over and the conditions of employment of the
employee group. Thus, the burden on employees desiring to bargain over
such an item is lighter than under other standards which balance compet-
ing interests.
In 1971, the Los Angeles County Employment Relations Commission
applied the significant relationship standard in deciding that the caseload
of welfare eligibility workers was a mandatory subject of bargaining despite
the reservation of management rights in the county bargaining ordi-
nance. 8° The Commission emphasized the existence of workload factors, a
traditional mandatory subject of bargaining in the private sector. Since de-
terminations of caseload affect the level or amount of service required of
the involved employees, they bear a significant relationship to conditions of
employment. Thus, even though such determinations were arguably related
to management policy, they were held to be mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing under the significant relationship test. The Nevada PERB, despite a
statutory management rights clause, also adopted the significant re-
lationship test in 1971 in holding that provisions relating to teacher prep-
aration time, class size, student discipline, school calendar, teaching load
and textbook selection were mandatory subjects. 8 '
Another standard that developed was the balancing standard, first
enunciated by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission in 1972. 82
This standard weighs the interests of both the employer and the employees
in determining whether the contested subject requires mandatory bargain-
ing. Such a test was subsequently adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court,
which stated:
It does little good, we think, to speak of negotiability in terms of
"policy" versus something which is not "policy." Salaries are a
matter of policy, and so are vacation and sick leaves. Yet we can-
not doubt the authority of the Board to negotiate and bind itself
on these issues. The key, as we see it, is how direct the impact of
an issue is on the well-being of an individual teacher, as opposed
8° Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Social Services and Dept. of Personnel, case No.
UFC 55.3 (1971), reprinted in, SMITH, EDWARDS AND CLARK,sUpra note 25, at 454, affd, 33 Cal.
App. 3c1 I, 108 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1973).
" Clark County School Dist., Washoe County School District, Item #3 (Nev. Local Gov't
Employee Management Relations Bd. 1971), aff'd, 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974) (manda-
tory bargaining will not dilute public employer's statutory right to direct employees within
broad policy framework established by employer). The statutory management rights reserva-
tion has since been considerably strengthened. NEV. Rr.v. STAT. § 288.150(3) (1975). See text
and notes 119-22 infra.
" See Westwood Community Schools, 1972 MERC LAB. 01'. 313, reprinted in Swat, En.
WARDS & CLARK, supra note 25, at 397, 400 (conflict between management rights and employee
interests appropriately reconciled by balancing interests; school calendar mandatory). The
Hawaii PERB adopted a balancing standard, not to distinguish mandatory from permissive
subjects but to distinguish mandatory from excluded subjects. Department of Education, Haw.
PERB, Dec. No. 26 (1973), reprinted in small. Eimakus & CLARK. supra note 25, at 446.
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to its net effect on the operation of the school system as a whole.
The line may be hard to draw, but in the absence of more assist-
ance from the legislature the courts must do the best they can."
Thus, by weighing the directness of a bargaining issue's impact on the in-
dividual teacher against the net effect of the issue on the operation of the
total school system, the court arrived at a balancing standard which
weighed both employee and employer interests. Except in Michigan, where
the strike ban has been held to justify a broad scope of bargaining, 84 such a
balancing standard is less expansive of the scope of mandatory bargaining
than the significant relationship standard because it goes beyond a de-
termination that the issue bears significant relation to working conditions
and considers how the issue affects the employer involved. Accordingly, the
standard has been utilized in holding class size to be merely permissive de-
spite the impact of class size on working conditions."
Other jurisdictions swung even further away from the expansive sig-
nificant relationship test. In 1972 the Nebraska Supreme Court announced
that it would require mandatory bargaining "only over those matters di-
rectly affecting the teacher's welfare." 88 In 1974 the South Dakota Supreme
Court excluded from mandatory bargaining any items which were not "ma-
terially" related to working conditions."
Thus, in utilizing the mandatory/permissive dichotomy of the private
sector, courts reached different results on scope of bargaining issues de-
pending on whether they used the significant relationship test, under which
"conditions of employment" were likely to be expanded, the less expansive
balancing approach, which required courts to consider managerial and pol-
icy concerns, or the least expansive approach, which excluded from manda-
tory bargaining any item not "materially related" or "directly affecting"
working conditions.
III. THE REDEF1NITIONAL RESPONSE
The remaining sections of this article will examine redefinitional re-
sponses to scope of bargaining issues as well as redefinitions of the distinc-
tion between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. After
analyzing problems apparent in the mandatory/permissive dichotomy, a
model for negotiability determination in the absence of a permissive cate-
gory will be recommended and discussed.
"3 National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512 P.2d 426, 435
(1973).
" 4 See description and criticism of this approach at note 34 supra.
"See National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512 P.2d 426, 435
(1973) (class size, curriculum, use of substitute teachers and teacher aides merely permissive;
transfer, evaluation and disciplinary procedures mandatory); Biddeford v. Biddeford
Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) (class size, teaching day length, school calendar, cur-
riculum merely permissive; length of required day, use of teaching aides and specialist
teachers mandatory).
86 Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 118 Neb. 772, 784, 199 N.W.2d 752,
759 (1972) (class size, curriculum, and hiring of specialists permissive).
87 Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ.,—S.D.—, 215 N.W.2d 837 (1974)
(class size, preparation periods, use of teacher aides, and expansion of audio-visual use
excluded from mandatory bargaining). -
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A. The Scope of Permissible Bargaining and Enforceable Agreement
1. The Initial Trend
The response to the initial formulations of a standard of negotiability
appeared to favor expansion of the scope of permissible negotiations. Many
jurisdictions looked with approval to the standard adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals in Huntington, in which the employer's authority to
negotiate was limited only by specific, clear statutory prohibitions. For in-
stance, the New Jersey legislature, although not explicitly adopting the
Huntington standard, rejected the more deferential approach to preexisting
statutory procedures which reposit duty or discretion in particular public
officials or governmental agencies. The New Jersey Court in Duneleen had
barred arbitration of a decision to abolish a chairmanship and in dicta
might have barred arbitration of all disniissal decisions because of existing
statutory procedures for review of controversies involving determinations
of educational policy. In 1974 the state legislature reacted to that decision
by enacting grievance procedure legislation dealing with such potential
statutory conflict which effectively overruled that dicta and possibly the
holding as well." At the same time the legislature amended the earlier
statutory conflict provision so as to give precedence over collectively bar-
gained outcomes only to pension statutes. 8g It is still unclear how expan-
sively the courts will interpret the bargaining statute as amended."
Other states had similar responses. The Michigan Supreme Court re-
treated slightly from its more expansive stance—providing that collective
bargaining legislation would govern in the event of conflict with existing
B Notwithstanding any procedures for the resolution of disputes, controversies
or grievances established by any other statute, grievance procedures established
by agreement between the public employer and the representative organization
shall be utilized for any dispute covered by the terms of such agreement.
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3, (West 1965) as amended by 1974 N.J. Laws ch. 123, 4.
" N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. 34:13A-8.1 (West 1965) as amended by 1974 N.J. Laws ch. 123, §
6.
" While the New Jersey Supreme Court has yet to rule on the effect of the 1974
amendments, the lower courts continue to preserve a hard-core area of managerial discretion.
See Clifton Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 136 N.J. Super. 336, 346 A.2d 107 (App. Div.
1975) (no bargaining may be allowed over statutory right to withhold salary increments for in-
efficiency or other good cause; management's prerogative to assess quality of teacher per-
formance); Board of Educ. v. North Bergen Teachers Ass'n, 141 N.J. Super. 97, 357 A.2d 302
(App. Div. 1976) (public employer's right to determine criteria for promotion and to select
candidates for promotion from within or without the bargaining unit not arbitrable); Board of
Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 150 N.J. Super. 265, 375 A.2d 669 (App. Div. 1977), rev'g
2 N.J. PERC 72 (March 23, 1976) (termination of nontenured teachers pursuant to re-
ductions in force not arbitrable). But cf. Red Bank Bd. of Educ, v. Warrington, 138 N.J.
Super. 564, 351 A.2d 778 (App. Div. 1976) (1974 amendments bvoring resolution of disputes
through contractual grievance mechanisms helped persuade the court to hold that the assign-
ment of an extra teaching period during time formerly used as a preparation period was ar-
bitrable); Newark Teachers Union Local 481 v. Board of Educ., 95 L.R.R.M. 2525 (App. Div.
1977) (failure to follow contractual evaluation procedures in terminating nontenured teachers
arbitrable, but relies on N.J. PERC decision overturned in Engkwood, supra). See also Board of
Educ. and Rockaway Township Educ, Ass'n, Docket No. SN-76-2, N.J. PERC (June 3, 1976),
GERR No. 680, C-5, applying substantive law as construed in Dunellen since the contract in
issue predated the 1974 amendments, and finding a contractual provision calling for automa-
tic extended sick leave benefits to be neither arbitrable nor negotiable because inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Education Law.
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legislation—to a position which produced results similar to that of the
Huntington standard." In addition, courts in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Maine
and Rhode Island explicitly adopted the Huntington approach and limited
the scope of permissible bargaining only by specific prohibitions or only
where bargained provisions actually violated existing law. 92 In Pennsyl-
vania, an issue was removed from bargaining only if the legislature had
specifically mandated that a particular responsibility be performed exclu-
sively by the employer. 93
Courts in Minnesota and Oregon also reached results which may in-
dicate an approach nearly as expansive as that adopted in Huntington. The
Minnesota Supreme Court demonstrated reluctance to limit collective bar-
gaining except when agreement is in direct conflict with another statute,
municipal charter or statewide administrative regulation." The court held
that a collective bargaining agreement could not limit a city charter's grant
of official discretion to suspend subordinates for disciplinary purposes.
However, the court also held that the subject of written reprimands,
though a lesser exercise of discretion, was mandatorily negotiable since that
subject was not dealt with in the charter."
Similarly, the Oregon appellate courts limited the exclusive effect of
existing enactments to explicit prohibitions." For instance, the court of ap-
" See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974) (In-
stead of reaffirming its earlier holding that the bargaining statute impliedly repeals existing
enactments to the extent of any repugnancy, the court went to great lengths to construe the
earlier Home Rule Cities Act narrowly enough to permit collective bargaining over pension
plans. The Court divined a distinction between the broad "procedural" outline of a plan, sub-
ject to amendment only by popular vote, and the "substantive" details to be filled in by collec-
tive bargaining). See also Local 1905, AFSCME v. Recorder's Court Judges, 399 Mich. 1, 248
N.W.2d 220 (1976) (A specific statute establishing dismissal procedures for court employees
prevails over a bargained grievance procedure). But cf. Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. Pontiac,
397 Mich. 674, 246 N.W.2d 831 (1974) (bargained grievance procedure for review of dis-
cipline of police officers prevails over city charter provision for civilian review board).
• " See Superintending School Comm. v. Winslow Educ. Ass'n, 363 A.2d 229 (Me. 1976);
Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 509, 337 A.2d 262,
269 (1975); Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332, 346 A.2d 124 (1975); Danville Bd. of School
Directors v. Fifield, 132 Vt. 271, 275-76, 315 A.2d 473, 475-76 (1974). Although the Maine
Court adopted the New York and Pennsylvania approaches, 363 A.2d at 231-32, language in
the opinion may indicate differences in the application of that standard. See text at note 116
infra.
It is interesting to note that both Maine and Pennsylvania also use the balancing stan-
dard for determining mandatory negotiability. See text at notes 82-85 supra and notes 123-25
infra.
9 ' Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 510, 337 A.2d 262,
269-70 (1975). The Pennsylvania court has since determined tinder the announced test that a
school board may agree to arbitrate the dismissal of non-tenured teachers pursuant to a just
cause standard. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, 464 Pa. 92, 346 A.2d 35
(1975). Very recently the court held that an unsatisfactory performance rating is arbitrable
although the rating was one basis of a dismissal proceeding instituted against a tenured
teacher. Milberry v. Board of Educ.,—Pa.—, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
94 See Teamsters Local 320 v. Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 225 N.W.2d 254 (1975).
"/d. at 415, 225 N.W.2d at 257, 259. The court held that it was required to defer to
the specific charter provision by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(5) (West 1973), voiding contract
provisions which violate or conflict with statutes, regulations or municipal charter provisions.
See also Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers, Local 59 v. School Dist. No. 1, 95 L.R.R.M. 2359
(Minn. 1977) (individual transfers of teachers are arbitrable).
99 See Central Point School Dist. v, Employment Rel. Bd., 27 Or. App. 285, 555 P.2d
1269 (1976) (no constitutional or statutory proscription of school district's agreement to arbi-
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peals in that state rejected the view of the Oregon Employment Relations
Board that bargaining ".. . over matters which rest primarily in the policy
or governmental domain, or which are entrusted to their exclusive discre-
tion by law ..." would constitute an illegal delegation Of statutory duties.97
Thus, the Oregon courts appeared to move away from the view that exist-
ing enactments exude an aura of exclusivity to a view more accepting of
the role of collective bargaining in the political process."
In states which still have no collective bargaining legislation expressing
any legislative intent to defer to bargained determinations of conditions of
employment, the scope of permissible negotiations has remained much nar-
rower" or even non-existent.'°° The policy expressed in existing formula-
tions actually may limit the public employer's discretion to afford the
employees more protection than is already afforded by enactment. Thus,
overall the initial trend of redefinition in formulating a standard of
negotiability favored an expansive scope of bargaining by adopting the
Huntington approach which required specific and clear statutory pro-
hibitions before an employer's authority to negotiate would be limited.
2. Contract Enforcement: The Redefinitional Pendulum Swings Back
More recently, as jurisdictions have defined and redefined their initial
approaches to balancing the interest of public employees in a meaningful
trate questions of teacher dismissal); Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 19, 24 Or.
App. 751, 547 P.2d 647 (1976) (reversing Oregon Employment Relations Board holding that
bargaining over school district's contracts with university for student teaching programs was
prohibited). See also Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 30. 25 Or. App. 85, 548 P.2d
204 (1976) (remanding to Oregon Employment Relations Board its holding that bargaining
over student disciplinary rules was merely permissive because of statutory requirement that
school boards adopt disciplinary rules; bargaining allowed as to content of rules so long as
agreement is consistent with statewide rules).
97 Springfield Echic. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 19, 24 Or. App. 751, 760, 547 P.2d 647,
650 (1976).
"But see City of Hermiston v. Employment Rel. Bd., 27 Or. App. 755, 557 P.2d 681
(1976) (bargaining statute unconstitutional as applied to home rule cities). It is difficult to re-
concile this opinion with the general trend in Oregon except to analyze the decision as con-
cerning those employees covered by the bargaining statute and not as concerning the permis-
sible scope of bargaining of those employees covered. But in a sense, the lack of coverage
under the statute may only be a broader expression of those enactments which may restrict
the permissible scope of bargaining. Compare Teamsters Local 320 v. Minneapolis, 502 Minn.
410, 225 N.W.2d 254 (1975) (home rule city charter provision allowing discipline of employees
prevails over bargained grievance procedure, under statutory conflict provision) and PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (1970) (preserving precedence of home rule charter provisions) with
Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974) (home rule cities re-
quired to bargain over pension plans and residency requirements) and Pontiac Police Officers
Ass'n v. Pontiac, 397 Mich. 674, 246 N.W.2d 831 (1976) (bargained grievance procedures for
review of discipline of police officers prevails over provision in municipal charter for civilian
review board). See also text and note 57 supra and note 95 supra.
Cf Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 62 111.2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975) (con-
tractual procedures For evaluation of probationary teachers neither negotiable nor enforce-
able); Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 62 Ill.2d 470, 343 N.E.2d
47 (1976) (questions relating to dismissal or demotion of non-tenured teachers neither arbitra-
ble nor enforceable).
I " Cf. Commonwealth of Va. v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977) (county
board and school board may not enter into collective bargaining agreement in absence of au-
thorizing statute). But cf. Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County School Dist. No. 6,—
Col.—, 553 P.2d 793 (1976) (school board has power to enter into collective bargaining
agreement despite absence of express legislative authority).
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voice in determining their conditions of employment and the public in-
terest in maintaining a meaningful voice in political decisions allocating
governmental resources, a countertrend has developed calling for greater
recognition of public policy concerns. A growing number of judicial de-
cisions in the last two years has reintroduced policy concerns restrictive of
the permissible scope of bargaining at the contract enforcement stage. This
may reflect a lasting effect of the changing economic and political climate.
The New York Court of Appeals in Huntington had initially
established an expansive tone for the policy favoring collective bargaining,
limiting permissible bargaining only by express prohibitions in existing
political enactments. Despite the trend in other jurisdictions favoring this
expansive approach the New York Court itself recently displayed second
thoughts about looking only to explicit statutory prohibitions to limit the
scope of negotiations and binding agreement. In 1975 the court announced
in Susquehanna Valley Central School District v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers As-
sociation 1 °' that it would consider policy factors in delineating the limits of
enforceable agreement:
Public policy, whether derived from, and whether explicit or im-
plicit in statute or decisional law, or in neither, may also restrict
the freedom to arbitrate.
Key to the analysis is that the freedom to contract in exclu-
sively private enterprises ... does not blanket public school mat-
ters because of the governmental interests and public concerns
which may be involved, however rarely that may be. 102
The Court of Appeals struggled to flesh out an area of concern in which
statutes which do not expressly proscribe the bargained result may yet
serve as notice that the courts should look harder at the underlying policy
interests. However, the willingness to consider policy concerns in determin-
ing the scope of enforceable agreement did not aid the school district in
Susquehanna. The court actually held that neither public policy nor plain
and clear statutory prohibitions existed to prevent a school board from
agreeing to stabilize the size of the work force. 103 While the Susquehanna
court felt that the injection of public policy considerations did not tip the
scales in favor of the public employer on this issue, its language served
notice that the court would not hesitate in future disputes to search for ex-
pression of governmental interests and public concerns.
Despite the New York Court of Appeals' new concern with public
policy interests, recent decisions have not indicated a consistent trend to-
ward a more limited scope of negotiability. In several recent cases the
101 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975).
'°' Id, at 616.17, 339 N.E.2d at 133-34, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
in Even so, the attempt to introduce policy limits arising out of existing political expres-
sions did not slide by easily. The move aroused a vigorous response from justice Fuchsberg:
The notion that courts may freely assume the role of arbitrators of public policy
is a very much exaggerated one. Most especially, they should avoid doing so in
the face of a statutory scheme which bespeaks its own policy considerations ....
It can hardly be disputed that legislative concern, activity and enactment are at
the heart of the sensitive and growing field of labor relations in the public sector
Id. at 618, 339 N.E.2d at 134, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 430 (concurring opinion).
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Court of Appeals has found no more restrictive public policy than was
present in Susquehanna.'" For example, in Board of Education, Yonkers City
School District v. Yonkers Federation of Teachers,'" the court upheld the arbi-
trability of job security provisions freezing staff size despite the generally
conservative fiscal policy expressed in the Financial Emergency Act for the
City of Yonkers."° In fact the Yonkers decision may have even expanded
the Huntington standard. Relying on New York PERB determinations, a
lower court had held that since the abolition of a position for budgetary
reasons did not constitute a term or condition of employment, job security
provisions preventing such action were not enforceable.'° 7 Although Hunt-
ington had established only that a public employer had the power, limited
by statutory prohibitions, to negotiate over terms or conditions of employ-
ment,'" the court cited Huntington in support of an even broader proposi-
tion:
[P]tiblic employers are required to negotiate collectively with
public employee organizations in determining the "terms and
conditions of employment" .... But this is not the limit of the
employer's power. To effectuate the public policy favoring
negotiation as the means of insuring "harmonious and coopera-
tive relationships between government and its employees," a pub-
lic employer possesses broad power voluntarily to negotiate all
matters in controversy, whether or not they involve "terms and
conditions of employment" subject to mandatory bargaining, and
to agree to submit such controversies to arbitration .. . .'"
Thus, Yonkers seemingly expanded the Huntington standard by suggesting
that a public employer might voluntarily negotiate and agree to arbitrate
matters not involving terms and conditions of employment. Since the job
security provision had been negotiated before the financial emergency was
declared, that is, before any definitive public policy statement on job secu-
rity, the court in Yonkers held that it was arbitrable.
Not until 1976 did the New York Court of Appeals finally grant a re-
strictive interpretation to public policy concerns. In Cohoes City School District
J.. cf. Matter of Burke v. Bowen, 90 N.Y.2d 264, 353 N.E.2d 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 654
(1976) (job security provision arbitrable); Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed. of Teachers, 40
N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976) (same); New York City School Boards
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976) (reduction
in students' hours of instruction negotiable); Board of Educ. v. Bellmore-Merrick United Sec-
ondary Teachers, 39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603, 383 N.Y,S.2d 242 (1976) (arbitral award of
temporary reinstatement of probationary teacher without tenure doesn't violate public policy).
But cf. Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878,
390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976) (tenure decisions not arbitrable); Board of Educ. v. Areman, 95
L.R.R.M. 2165 (1977) (school board's right to examine teachers' files not arbitrable).
'°' 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
we Id. See also Matter of Burke v. Bowen, 40 N.Y.2d 264, 353 N.E.2d 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d
654 (1976) (job security provision arbitrable). But cf. Crossing Guard Union v. Yonkers, 39
N.Y.2d 964, 354 N.E.2d 846, 387 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1976) (contract provision not a bona fide job
security provision, therefore not arbitrable).
107 Matter of Lippman v. Delaney, 48 App. Div.2d 913, 914-15, 370 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130
(1975).
"8 Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d at 127, 282 N.E.2d at 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
' 09 Yonkers, 40 N.Y.2d at 271, 353 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N,Y.S.2d at 659, quoting Civil
Service Law, § 204, subd. 2, and Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23, 282
N.E.2d 109, 113.
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v. Cohoes Teachers Association,"° the court held that an arbitral award of re-
instatement which would result in a grant of tenure violates the public pol-
icy expressed in the Education Laws leaving tenure decisions to school
boards. The school board could not relinquish through a just cause provi-
sion the ultimate responsibility vested in the Board by statute to make ten-
ure determinations.'" Similarly, in another recent case the Court of Ap-
peals held that public policy bars a school board from bargaining away its
right to examine teachers' files. Especially in the area of tenure decisions,
the New York Court noted, school boafds should ultimately be responsible
for the employment of qualified teachers." 2 Thus, the Huntington standard
in New York has been partially eroded by the recognition of policy con-
cerns not explicitly expressed in statutes or areas conflicting with collective
bargaining statutes.
While the New York Court of Appeals was still paying lip service to
restrictive policy concerns, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
took to heart the idea expressed in Susquehanna that public policy concerns,
even if only implicit in statutory law, may restrict the scope of permissible
bargaining and enforceable agreement. In School Committee of Hanover v.
Cuny," 3
 the Massachusetts Court held, contrary to Yonkers, that a decision
to abolish a position, even if the decision results in lay-off or demotion, is
not arbitrable." 4
 The Supreme Judicial Court found the policy concerns
implicit in that state's education law sufficient to commit a decision to
abolish a position to the exclusive, nondelegable decision of the school
committee. The court thereby delineated an area of exclusive managerial
prerogative similar in scope to that defined by the holding of the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court in Dunellen that the decision to consolidate departments
is not arbitrable. 15
"" 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N,Y.S.2d 53 (1976).
" 1
 Although an arbitral award of reinstatement cannot result in tenure, the arbitrator
can award temporary reinstatement without tenure for purposes of reevaluation where viola-
tions of contractual evaluation procedures are found. Board of Educ. v. Bellmore-Merrick
United Secondary Teachers, 39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603, 383 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1976). See
discussion of recent Massachusetts decisions at notes 113-14 infra. See Central Point School
Dist. v. Employment Rel. Bd., 27 Or. App. 285, 555 P.2d 1269 (1976), where the Oregon
Court, using a standard very much like the original Huntington test, allowed arbitration of
teacher dismissal though resulting in tenure.
11
 Board of Educ. v. Areman, 95 L.R.R.M. 2165 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).
113
 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
"I Id. at 397, 343 N.E.2d at 145. But cf. School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976
Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145 (1976) (though arbitrator could not order reinstatement
since decision to abolish position was not arbitrable, arbitrator could determine that the af-
fected teacher was entitled to compensation).
The opposite result reached in New York in Yonkers from that in Massachusetts in
Hanover may be in part a function of the absence of any provision in the New York bargaining
statute, N.Y. Cm SERV. Law §§ 200 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1976), granting any precedence to
existing enactments and the presence of such a provision in both the statute at issue in
Hanover, Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 149, § 1781 (West 1973), and the present public employee
bargaining statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 150E, § 7 (West Supp. 1976). See note 55 supra.
"3 See text at note 61 supra. It is interesting to note the similarity of the statutory con-
flict provision in Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 7 (formerly. ch . 149, §
1781) (West 1976), to that which existed in New Jersey prior to the 1974 amendments, supra
note 62. It is possible that despite the amendment, the range of managerial decisions re-
presented by the narrow holding of Dunellen may survive. See note 90 supra. In a recent
triumverate of cases involving the arbitrability of tenure decisions the Supreme Judicial Court
continued its commitment to honoring exclusive, nondelegable statutory duties as or more re-
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Although the Maine Supreme Judicial Court recently adopted the
Huntington standard, the court's application of that standard in a recent
case indicates that the scope of permissible bargaining in Maine could be
restricted not only by specific statutory prohibitions but also by statutes
vesting broad responsibility or discretion in particular government
agencies.'" At issue was whether the school committee could be forced by
interest arbitration to accept just cause and arbitration provisions in a
1973-74 collective bargaining agreement. Absent a recent amendment
which expressly permitted the negotiation of just cause provisions, lan-
guage in the court's opinion suggested that a school board could not agree
to substantive review of dismissal decisions pursuant to a just cause stan-
dard. The court noted that existing statutory procedures expressed legisla-
tive balancing of the interests of teachers, pupils and the public."'
In sum, therefore, these judicial decisions of the past two years have
reintroduced policy concerns that serve to restrict the permissible scope of
bargaining at the contract enforcement stage, thereby eroding the expan-
sive scope of the Huntington standard.
B. Redefinition of the Distinction Between Mandatory and Permissive Subjects
The initial trend expansive of the scope of permissible bargaining
perhaps was made possible by the fact that most jurisdictions focused their
efforts to preserve a core area of policy concern on the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects. The tremendous variety of means used
by state and local legislative, judicial and administrative bodies to define the
distinction makes it no less difficult to characterize attempts to redefine the
intial approaches. Yet it can be said that if any definitional trend has
emerged from these bodies, that trend favors the use of the balancing
standard over the significant relationship test in determining whether to
require bargaining over an issue." 8
In 1975 the Nevada legislature rewrote the provisions regarding the
scope of mandatory bargaining in that state's public employee bargaining
strictive of the scope of permissible bargaining as public policy concerns in New York. See
School Comm. of Danvers v. Tynan, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877 (1977) (non-
renewal of teacher's contract arbitrable where failure to comply with evaluation procedure is
alleged though arbitrator may not grant tenure); Dennis-Yarmouth Reg'l School Comm. v.
Dennis Teachers Ass'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 428, 360 N.E.2d 883 (1977) (nonrenewal of
nontenured teacher contract not arbitrable though failure to follow contractual obligations in-
volving evaluations and teacher's files is arbitrable); School Comm. of W. Bridgewater v. West
Bridgewater Teachers' Ass'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 434, 560 N.E.2d 886 (1977) (reinstatement
without tenure for one year and back pay is appropriate award for failure to follow contrac-
tual procedures before making nonarbitrable notirenewal decision). The Supreme Judicial
Court expressly referred to the New York cases or Cohoes and Bellmore-Merrick in reaching
these results.
" 6 See Superintending School Comm. v. Winslow Educ. Ass'n, 363 A.2d 229 (Me. 1976).
1 " Id. at '234. The court actually held only that the just cause provision was not a pro-
per subject of compulsory interest arbitration. But the court applied a Huntington-type analysis
to determine if existing enactments would limit the scope of mandatory negotiation. The ease
with which the court found existing statutory procedures sufficiently comprehensive to limit
the scope of interest arbitration is more reminiscent of Dunellen than of Huntington, In fact,
the court cited in support of its position an Illinois decision denying the enforceability of a just
cause provision. See Special Educ. Cooperative v. Special Educ. Cooperative Ass'n, 33 III. App.
3d 789, 338 N.E.2d 463 (1973). Illinois has no legislation mandating any collective bargaining
so the scope of permissible bargaining is necessarily much narrower. See note 99 supra.
"" See Clark, supra note 33, at 92,	 185
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statute." 9
 The revision effectively overturned the application in Nevada of
the expansive significant relationship standard for determining the manda-
tory negotiability of an issue. The bargaining statute now limits mandatory
bargaining to a list of specifically enumerated items.' 2 ° Notable for its ab-
sence from the legislated list is the issue of class size, one of the key issues
previously held to be mandatory."' The statutory revision evidences a
wide-ranging reappraisal of initial attempts to define the scope of the duty
to bargain. Of particular note is the tightening of the management rights
clause so as to exclude proposals concerning workload factors and staffing
levels from the scope of mandatory bargaining.' 22 The legislature expressly
sought to preserve policy decisions concerning the level and quality of gov-
ernmental services for unilateral decision, when so desired by the public
employer. In so doing Nevada has pulled back from the more expansive
significant relationship standard to the general area outlined in other juris-
dictions by the application of the balancing standard.
In the same year the Pennsylvania Supreme Court swung to the
balancing standard from the opposite direction which previously had
greatly restricted mandatory bargaining. In Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board v. State College Area School District, 1 Y 3 hailed as a landmark decision in
the mandatory/permissive area,'" the court overturned a lower court deci-
sion that the statutory management rights clause required the exclusion
from mandatory bargaining of any matter which to any degree involved
inherent managerial policy. 125 The court remanded the case to the state
labor relations board to strike a balance between the competing interests of
employees and managerial or public policy:
Thus we hold that where an item of dispute is a matter of
fundamental concern to the employees' interests in wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, it is not re-
moved as a matter subject to good faith bargaining ... simply
because it may touch upon basic policy. It is the duty of the
Board in the first instance and the courts thereafter to determine
whether the impact of the issue on the interest of the employee
in wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment out-
weighs its probable effect on the basic policy of the system as a
whole.'"
Nay. REV. STAT. II 288.010 et seq. (1975).
" G NEV. RV... STAT. 288.150(2) (1975).
' 2 ' See Washoe County Teachers Ass'n v. Washoe County School Dist., 90 Nev. 442, 530
P.2d 114 (1974). See also text at note 81 supra.
"2 The new management rights clause preserves the right to hire, direct or transfer
employees; to lay off any employee because of staff reductions; to determine staffing levels,
work performance standards, workload factors, the quality and quantity of services offered,
and the means and methods of offering those services. Nay. REV. STAT, 288.150(3) (1975).
"3 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975), rev'g 9 Pa. Corn. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973), and
remanding to Labor Board.
"4 Clark, supra note 33, at 93-94. The decision is important partly because it maintains a
moderately expansive scope of mandatory subjects even though Pennsylvania allows strikes
over mandatory subjects. See text at notes 123-25.
1Y5 461 Pa. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268. In the same decision the court adopted a
Huntington-like standard for determining negotiability. Id. at 509, 337 A.2d at 269. See note 92
supra.
1 " Id.
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The Oregon appellate court has also adopted a balancing standard in
the wake of an extensive legislative revision of the bargaining
framework. 127
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin took a fresh look
at the scope of bargaining for public employees in that state and an-
nounced a very close fascimile to a balancing standard. 128 Most recently a
balancing standard has been adopted by the Massachusetts Labor Relations
Commission in a wide ranging review of scope of bargaining following ex-
tensive revision of the Massachusetts bargaining statute. 129
Thus, from legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, a trend
favoring the use of the balancing standard is emerging. This movement
toward a balancing standard reflects the operation of two opposite trends
in public sector bargaining: a recognition on the one hand that the scope of
bargaining need not be limited severely when the right to strike is granted,
and on the other hand that public policy issues must be preserved for an
accountable decision maker. That courts in Pennsylvania and Oregon have
adhered to a standard which is relatively expansive of the scope of manda-
tory bargaining is particularly significant. Both states allow public
employees, except those in "essential" services, to strike over unresolved
mandatory issues. The approval of the balancing standard thus represents
the developing attitude that the right to strike does not cause such a severe
dislocation of the "normal" political process that the scope of bargaining
must be limited severely. Yet a standard balancing governmental and public
interest with employee interests also reflects growing awareness that public
policy issues must be preserved for an accountable decision by the em-
ployer either to resolve the issue unilaterally or to agree to permissive bar-
gaining.'"
"T See Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist. No, 30, 25 Or. App. 85, 548 P.2d
204, 205 (1976), balancing "the element of educational policy involved against the effect that
the subject has on a teacher's employment." See also Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No.
19, 24 Or. App. 751, 547 P.2d 647 0976), upholding the decision of the Oregon Employee
Relations Board that class size, transfer procedures, school calendar, and use of substitute
teachers and teacher's aides are merely permissive while teaching load, preparation periods,
and a just cause standard for review of disciplinary action are mandatory subjects.
OR. REV. STAT. § 342.150 and 342.170, which limited bargaining with educational
employees to salaries and related educational policies, was repealed. (1973 Or. Laws ch. 536, §
39). Employees of' school districts, together with other public employees, are entitled to re-
quire bargaining over "matters concerning direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vaca-
tions, sick leave, grievance procedures, and other conditions of employment." OR. REV. STAT. §
243.650(7) (1975).
In See Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis.2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976),
upholding the determination of WERC that bargaining be required over "... matters primar-
ily relating to wages, hours, and conditions of employment" as well as over the impact of pol-
icy decisions on conditions of employment. Bargaining over class size and proposals to
establish reading programs and a summer school were held to be permissive, although the
impact of class size and any new services on wages and hours was held to be mandatory. Also
mandatory were evaluation procedures, staff' reduction procedures, school calendar, and stu-
dent disciplinary procedures.
'x9 
"In adopting [the mandatory/permissive doctrine] the Commission balances the in-
terests of employees in bargaining over a particular subject with the interest of' the public em-
ployer in maintaining its managerial prerogatives." Town of' Danvers and Local 3038, 3 MASS.
LAB. CAS. 1559, 1577 (M.L.R.C. 1977). The MLRC announced in holding minimum manning
requirements to be merely permissive and promotion procedures to be mandatory that it
would consider how direct an impact a topic has on conditions of employment and whether
the issue "involves a core governmental decision." Id. at 1577.
13° The move to reasonable facsimiles of the balancing standard in recent reappraisals
187
BOSTON COI I EGE LAW REVIEW
IV. APPRAISAL OF SCOPE OF BARGAINING TRENDS
Over the past fifteen years the underlying trend of granting collective
bargaining rights to public employees indicates growing acceptance of the
view that public employees need a special advantage in influencing de-
cisions affecting working conditions. The mere extension of a duty to bar-
gain to previously uncovered public employees evidences recognition of the
need to grant public employees a more effective voice in the governmental
decision-making process. Recent experience demonstrates the continuing
validity of such an observation as more jurisdictions extend collective bar-
gaining to more of their public employees.'" The initial expansive ap-
proach to negotiability and enforceability together with the adoption of the
moderately expansive balancing standard in states which allow strikes over
mandatory subjects also lends support to that view. But the tendency of
courts to speak in terms of a balancing standard in conjunction with pro-
liferating management rights reservations which are being written into
statutes and which delineate the scope of the mandatory duty to bargain
reflects a perception that public policy concerns must be given greater
weight in designing public sector bargaining frameworks. The balancing
standard rejects the expansive private sector approach personified by the
significant relationship standard by factoring in management or public pol-
icy interests which tend to restrict the scope of bargaining.
Some jurisdictions have not been satisfied with the results of the at-
tempt to sensitize the mandatory/permissive distinction to managerial policy
interests. Indeed, the recent trend toward reintroducing public policy con-
siderations at the contract enforcement stage may reflect a growing feeling
in those jurisdictions that merely allowing the public employer not to bar-
gain over managerial policy and prerogatives might not protect fundamen:
tal policy decisions. Public employers struggling to respond to a changing
economic and political climate by reducing the level of services find their
efforts restricted by existing agreements. Judicial restrictions of enforceable
agreements crystallize into legal rules political resistance to the intrusion of
collective bargaining on sensitive policy choices—in opinions which either
assert independent policy considerations, or read such considerations into
ambiguous or conflicting statutes. This redefinitional undercurrent may
well become the dominant form of change over the next several years.
of the scope of bargaining in Nevada, Wisconsin and Massachusetts evidences the response of
the legislative and judicial process to growing political resistance to the range of issues over
which public employees are allowed to bargain and thereby effectively exclude other groups
from participation. One recent exception to the trend toward a balancing standard is in North
Dakota, where the Supreme Court indicated, but did not hold, that the scope of bargaining
probably should be wider than that initially adopted in Nevada pursuant to the significant re-
lationship standard, because the statutory duty to bargain in North Dakota is expressed in
even broader terms than in the original Nevada formulation. Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulsen,
239 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1976).
' 31
 For instance, the duty to bargain was extended to state employees in Massachusetts
in 1974, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1 a seq. (West 1974); in Iowa, to local employees
in 1975 and to state employees in 1976, IOWA CODE ANN. § 20 (West Supp. 1976); and to pub-
lic employees in Florida in 1975, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.203 (West 1976). But see Hermiston v.
Employment Relations Board, 27 Or, App. 755, 557 P.2d 681 (1976) (barred the extension of
the duty to bargain to employees of home rule cities); Virginia v. County Board, 217 Va. 558,
232 S.E.2d 30 (1977) (barred any bargaining in absence of authorizing statute).
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Unfortunately the developing trends of analysis fail to confront the
significant issue: is the permissive category appropriate in the public sector?
Rather than increasing the opportunity for broader political participation,
the permissive category may actually limit the political accountability of
bargaining decisions by the public employer. Determinations of neotiabil-
ity by reference to articulated statutory prohibitions or policy de-
terminations may fall either too short of the mark or too long.
A. Problems with the Mand,atorylPermissive Dichotomy
Use of the permissive category, part of the baggage of the years of
private sector bargaining experience, is not justifiable in public sector bar-
gaining. In the private sector, if the union or employer decides to re-
linquish control over its own internal decision-making processes, the public
is concerned only as consumer with the availability and price of the product
or service. Individual consumers decide for themselves whether to buy a
particular product or service at the price or quality offered. Thus, private
choice governs production, consumption, and employment decisions, within
the parameters of survival and profit.
In the public sector, government provides the service. In contrast to
private sector services, choices about public services are not individual but
collective. The recipient disappointed in the level of services or the tax-
payer disappointed in the cost of that level of service has no choice but to
follow the collective decision. The taxpayer cannot decide not to pay taxes.
The recipient cannot usually go elsewhere for the service. Government ser-
vices are often provided precisely because substitutes are unavailable or are
prohibitively expensive. Therefore, decisions directly determining the na-
ture, level or existence of a service must remain open to political forms of
input or resolution. Decisions allocating governmental resources and de-
termining the nature of governmental services reflect significant ideologi-
cal differences about the political objectives of government spending.
The need to have fundamental policy decisions resolved in a manner
responsive to political input and change is not satisfied merely because both
the decision to bargain and the ultimate agreement are acquiesced in by
politically accountable, appointive or elective officials. In the early period of
public sector bargaining, public employee unions were able to force in-
experienced government negotiators to bargain over issues about which the
public officials may not even have known they could refuse to bargain. Par-
ties to bargaining then and now do not always make any practical distinc-
tion between mandatory and permissive subjects while bargaining.'" The
practical political accountability of the public official for permissive bargain-
ing decisions is not nearly as great as the practical accountability of the
management negotiator in the private sector.
Several factors may serve to limit the theoretical political accountabil-
ity of the public official. First, the allegiances of elected public officials are
not always to the public at large but often to particular constituencies which
"'One commentator reported that one year after the New York PERB held class size
to be merely permissive, about half of the administrators and half of the teachers responsible
for negotiations in the state had not even read the decision or a summary. J. WErrzmAN, THE
SCOPE or BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 304 (1975).
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may support public employee demands. Second, it is not always clear to
public officials that their agreement to a costly or inappropriate bargaining
provision will adversely affect them in the polls or in their appointive posi-
tion. Third, it may be difficult or impossible to identify the person re-
sponsible for the result. Fourth, the effect of the concession may not be vis-
ible to the public until much later. Fifth, the public at large may not really
understand the particular point. In any event, the public interest is difficult
to find and assess, especially in the short run bargaining situation when the
public official is under great stress from many directions.
Moreover, even if the public official were accountable for exercising
poor judgment, the agreement reached is not at all accountable. The politi-
cal process cannot work quickly enough to undo the politically unacceptable
consequences of collective bargaining. Agreement as to a permissive issue is
binding and enforceable for the term of the agreement. The dynamics of
the bargaining process are such that bargaining for a new contract will start
from the previous provisions, thus effectively perpetuating the results of
permissive bargaining. As a result of the -binding nature of agreement,
permissive bargaining can lead to irrevocable decisions on fundamental
questions of public policy.
Furthermore, in the present economic climate, more than ever before,
public employees are bargaining over the ultimate distribution of public re-
sources. As one commentator has noted, to satisfy the demands of one
group of public employees means to sacrifice the interests of other public
employees and political interest groups.' 33
Given both the binding nature of agreement as to permissive issues
and the obstacles to political accountability for unwise bargaining decisions,
the use of the permissive category to allow the scope of bargaining ulti-
mately to be defined at the bargaining table is unacceptable. De-
terminations of the scope of bargaining must focus on whether and when
policy considerations require that the resolution of an issue be left open to
political methods of balancing competing interests. When political balancing
is not required then collective bargaining ought to be.'"
B. Problems With Determinations of Negotiability and Enforceability
In addition to problems with the political accountability of public
employees utilizing the permissive category in collective bargaining, there
are also difficulties inherent in the analytical frameworks used to determine
whether an issue is negotiable or whether a negotiated agreement is en-
forceable. These frameworks recognize only in a backhanded manner the
need to preserve certain issues for political forms of influence, resolution
or change. Huntington and its progeny allow the presumption of negotiabil-
ity to be rebutted only by specific, clear prohibitions. In a sense, the search
for bargaining prohibitions implicit in or made explicit by legislative,
municipal and administrative enactments is the search for evidence of an
intention that an issue be resolved politically. The easiest means of de-
termining that an issue ought to be resolved politically is to ask whether the
'" See Lewin, supra note 31.
134 Two jurisdictions, Hawaii and California, have reached the argued-for result and
eliminated the permissive category. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-9(d) (1975), supra note 53; CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West 1976), supra note 53. Indiana may have. See note 53 supra.
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issue already has been so resolved. Existing political determinations—
legislative, administrative or municipal—expressed so broadly and clearly as
to rise to the level of a prohibition of bargaining, have understandably
been granted great evidentiary weight, whether at the intial insistence of
the legislature or by judicial inference. Mere public policy concerns of un-
certain source of definition usually have received a cooler welcome.
But evidence as to whether an issue was resolved politically before the
advent of' collective bargaining does not confront the possibility that collec-
tive bargaining may either obviate the need for the preexisting political de-
termination or create political distortions despite the absence of a preexist-
ing political expression. Just because an issue has not yet been resolved
politically does not mean that collective bargaining ought to be able to close
off determination of the issue from political forms of resolution or change.
The absence of an articulated policy expression may indicate only the de-
sire to leave an issue open to changing political currents at a level closer to
the issue itself—such as with a municipal government or administrative
agency. The increasing concern at the contract enforcement stage with pub-
lic policy concerns restrictive of permissible bargaining reflects that percep-
tion. On the other hand, just because an issue may have been resolved
politically before the advent of collective bargaining does not mean that col-
lective bargaining is an inappropriate means of resolving the issue. The
proper question is not whether an existing prohibition or implicit policy
concern precludes bargaining over an issue but whether collective bargain-
ing is an appropriate or necessary means of resolving the issue.
The results in New York and in Massachusetts of the judicial attempt
to reintroduce considerations of public policy concerns restrictive of per-
missible agreement at the contract enforcement stage illustrate the prob-
lems inherent in relying only on articulated policy expressions to delimit
the scope of permissible agreement. Issues which are negotiable because
existing enactments neither clearly prohibit bargaining nor express a policy
that the issue be resolved outside of bargaining become non-negotiable or
unenforceable once public policy is articulated. Yet the political process
consideration existed before the policy was articulated. The issue either
never should have been negotiable or still should be negotiable despite the
change in circumstances.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the enforceability of bargain-
ing provisions freezing staff size in Susquehanna'" and in Yonkers.'" The
job security provision preventing the abolition of any position in Yonkers
was upheld despite the existence of a legislatively declared financial
emergency since the provision had been negotiated before the emergency.
Had the provision been negotiated after the emergency was declared the
court would not have allowed enforcement because of the public policy
expressed in the Financial Emergency Act. It is submitted therefore that
the important issue should have been whether collective bargaining was an
appropriate means of resolving the issue, not whether the agreement pre-
ceded the legislative declaration.
Subsequently, in New York City School Boards Association v. Board of Edu-
1 " See text at note 101 supra.
36 See text at note 105 supra.
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cation of New York,' 37 the Court of Appeals upheld the power of the school
board to negotiate a reduction in students' hours of instruction.' 38
 The
court, applying Huntington and Susquehanna, found that no statute or
applicable public policy prohibited bargaining resulting in reductions in the
hours of instruction to a level above minimum standards mandated by any
higher authority. Following the agreement for the school year in issue,
however, the State Commissioner of Education promulgated regulations
establishing minimum hours of instruction. The hoard was free to
negotiate the reduction but only until the Commissioner's regulations be-
came effective. Again, it is submitted that the crucial issue should have
been the appropriateness of collective bargaining to resolve the con-
troversy, not the timing of the regulation.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts faced a similar problem
with as yet unarticulated policy concerns in Boston Teachers Union, Local 66,
American Federation of Teachers v. School Committee of Boston. 139 The court
reached the relatively straightforward conclusion that provisions of the con-
tract mandating the use of substitute teachers and establishing class size
and teacher load limits were enforceable. Therefore, the school committee's
refusal to hire substitute teachers, resulting in an increase in class size and
teaching load, was arbitrable. Continuing its reliance on the Huntington-
Susquehanna analytic framework, the court declared that "... enforcement
will neither infringe on the school committee's prerogative to determine
policy nor contravene statutory limitations.' , I 40
 The straightforward ap-
proach then gave way to the confusion engendered by the failure to resolve
from the beginning whether policy concerns predominated to such an ex-
tent that binding agreement should be barred. The court announced that
the provisions were enforceable because the school committee had suffi-
cient funds to hire substitute teachers, appropriated for that purpose, and
had not changed its policy determination that the class size and teaching
load limits were educationally desirable:
A school committee is entitled to maintain its own position on
these subjects as matters of fiscal management and educational
policy. When, however, an agreement is made on these subjects
consistent with the committee's view of fiscal management and
educational policy, the terms of that agreement may be enforced
where there has been no change in educational policy and funds are
available to implement the terms of the agreement."'
17
 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976).
I 35 Id. In return for the Board's agreement to reduce students' hours of instruction
ninety minutes per week the teachers waived an equal amount of preparation time. The ar-
rangement enabled savings estimated to be anywhere from $25 to $50 million. 347 N.E.2d at
574.
1 " 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515, 350 N.E.2d 707.
1 " 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1526-28, 350 N.E.2d at 714.
1 " 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1528, 350 N.E.2d at 714 (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted).
The court appealed to the legislature for guidance which it will need and which should
be provided in any event, since the balancing of policy interests is a legislative function:
The Legislature can remove considerable uncertainty concerning which subjects
are proper matters for collective bargaining between teachers and school commit-
tees. It might define those subjects which can or cannot be incorporated in a
binding collective bargaining agreement. It might state that, to the extent certain
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Thus, apparently in Massachusetts, as in New York, as yet un-
articulated policy concerns may limit enforceable agreements once articu-
lated, and the public employer may negotiate about matters of policy or fis-
cal management. But if the employer's fiscal position or policy determina-
tion changes, Boston Teachers Union and New York City School Boards Associa-
tion suggest that any agreement reached might not be binding.'"
The decisions in Yonkers, New York City School Boards Association, and
Boston Teachers Union illustrate a major failing of the Huntington-
Susquehanna approach. The insistence even under Susquehanna on articu-
lated expressions of public policy before limiting bargaining fails to account
for a wide range of situations in which public policy concerns predominate
but have not yet been articulated. The courts can only recognize public pol-
icy concerns once the legislature or a public official speaks on an entirely
separate issue from that of the bargaining process versus the political pro-
cess. The real negotiability issue, whether the item is appropriately de-
termined in the bargaining agreement or in the political arena, is never re-
ally confronted)"
Approaches such as in New York and Massachusetts which rely on
existing political pronouncements as evidence that an issue should be re-
solved politically do not properly locate and define public policy interests
which should preclude bargaining. Reliance on existing pronouncements of
public policy allows later shifts in the political and economic situation to
change not only the policy outlook but also the scope of bargaining and en-
forceable agreement. This should not be the case. In areas where it is
necessary to preserve the ability of the political process to make necessary
tradeoffs between the costs and the level or existence of a service there
never should be bargaining. Where binding agreement over an issue such
as staff size or students' hours of instruction hinders the ability of the pub-
lie employer to respond to changing priorities by lowering or raising the
level of services, the issue should never be bargained.'" The policy protect-
ing political tradeoffs is always present even though no particular tradeoff
has been expressed.
On the other hand, the modified Huntington approach—presumption
of negotiability until after policy expression or unless previous legislative
matters are made a part of the collective bargaining agreement, the school com-
mittee has lost its prerogative during the term of the bargaining agreement to
exercise its otherwise exclusive control over matters of educational policy, except
perhaps in certain circumstances. In the absence of further statutory definition,
the subject of the scope of permissible, binding collective bargaining and the en-
forceability of such agreement will have to be dealt with on a case by case basis.
1976 Mass.-Adv. Sh, at 1528, 350 N.E.2d at 714.
142 The Massachusetts Court reaffirmed its confusing approach by holding recently that,
although a school committee cannot bargain away its authority to make tenure decisions, it
may, "as a matter of educational policy," submit particular tenure questions to arbitration.
School Comm. of' Danvers v. Tyman, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh, 415, 423 n.5, 360 N.E.2d 877, 881
n.5. The court appears to be creating some sort of hybrid permissive/illegal category of bar-
gaining subjects.
143
 The unwillingness or inability to confront the underlying question is highlighted by
the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in School Crossing Guard Union v. Yonkers,
39 N.Y.2d 964, 354 N.E.2d 846, 387 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1976). The court held the bargaining pro-
vision in issue not to be arbitrable as not a bona fide job security provision in the same sense
as in Yonkers. Yet the court did not explain why the provision as characterized so violated pub-
lic policy as to be unenforceable.
'" See text at notes 153-59 infra.
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intention discovered—may give too much weight to legislative frameworks
or policy expressions conflicting with collective bargaining outcomes. If
binding agreement about an issue like class size does not itself restrict polit-
ical balancing then the issue should always be bargained and agreement
always enforceable.'" In addition, not all statutory frameworks need be
preserved once collective bargaining has resolved a particular area of con-
cern. The New Jersey legislature recognized this fact by declaring in re-
sponse to Dunelien that contractual grievance procedures may replace exist-
ing statutory procedures for review.'" The Maine legislature also rec-
ognized this fact in declaring just cause provisions to be negotiable before
the Supreme Judicial Court could decide otherwise.' 47 Yet many jurisdic-
tions continue to grant blind deference to existing expressions of policy.'"
In the final analysis, it is necessary to develop a method of determining
when an item must and must not be negotiated. This method must be sen-
sitive to the delicate balance between the protection of the political process
and the proper functioning of the bargaining process. The intermediate
permissive category must not be allowed to interfere with this method by
granting the public employer discretion to bargain over the item.
V. A MODEL FOR NEGOTIABILITY DETERMINATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF A
PERMISSIVE CATEGORY
This final section will suggest a model for making appropriate
negotiability determinations in light of criticisms made of existing systems
in the preceding section. The model does not contain a permissive cate-
gory.
It must first be recognized that collective bargaining grants public
employees special access to and influence over governmental decisions con-
cerning those issues bargained.' 49 Second, it must be noted that collective
bargaining is intended to be a bilateral process. Other interest groups are
excluded from formal presentation of their concerns, and their concerns
need not even be considered in reaching an accomodation. Third, collective
bargaining statutes mandate good faith bargaining, generally understood to
include a sincere desire to reach agreement. The public employer has no
such obligation to attempt to reach agreement with other interest groups.
Fourth, collective bargaining takes place with an exclusive representative of
the public employer who sharpens the presentation of demands by present-
ing a unified position and focusing the issues. Finally, the agreement
145 See text at notes 153-54 infra.
"'See text at notes 88-89 supra.
47 See text at notes 116-17 supra.
148 The just cause standard for review of disciplinary decisions is not yet a mandatory
subject open to compulsory interest arbitration in Maine because of the educational policy
found by the court in existing enactments. See text at notes 116-17 supra. In Minnesota, the
statutory conflict provision in the public sector bargaining statute has been interpreted to
allow municipal charter provisions to overrride negotiated grievance procedures. See
Teamsters Local 320 v. Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 225 N.W.2d 254 (1975). The Minnesota
legislature, evidently recognizing the unnecessary intrusion of the municipal charter provision
on collective bargaining, legislated a reduction in the discretion of city officials to suspend
subordinates for disciplinary purposes from a ninety day period to a thirty day period.
149 See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L. J. 1156,
1164-65 (1974) [hereinafter Summers).
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reached is binding. The decision made cannot be reconsidered during the
term of the agreement. Other interest groups are effectively excluded from
the decision-making process at least for the life of the agreement.
When is special access to a governmental decision appropriate? The
relative advantage granted to public employees is warranted in areas of
decision-making which primarily determine only the labor costs of a ser-
vice. In those areas public employees are directly competing in the
budget-making process with taxpayers and users of services:
employees are at a unique disadvantage in the com-
plex political bargaining process of budget-making. They are not
one interest group among many in multilateral bargaining, but
rather stand alone confronting the combined opposition of all
the other interest groups. They must contend with both those
groups opposing increased taxes and those seeking increased
services. Because labor costs make up such a large portion of the
budget, the employees' claims are highly visible to the other in-
terest groups and thus vulnerable to their concerted attack.
In the absence of collective bargaining, the budget-making
process ... leaves public employees unable to protect their in-
terests adequately against those whose interests are opposed.'"
Additionally, collective bargaining is both necessary and trustworthy over
issues which essentially determine how much service at what pay each
employee will provide, from which can be calculated how many employees
at what total cost will be necessary to provide any given level or quality of
service. The labor costs which public employees will be able to impose will
depend ultimately upon the level and quality of services for which the pub-
lic is willing to pay. The public, or the public employer responding to
broad expressions of public desire, must remain free to choose the desired
level and nature of a service given what the total cost of that level of service
will be. The choice of budgetary priorities and the nature of the service re-
flect significant ideological differences about the social and political objec-
tives toward which governmental resources should be directed. Such fun-
damental public policy choices, basic issues of political power, should not be
isolated in the bilateral process of collective bargaining from participation
by affected individuals or groups necessarily excluded from the bargaining
process. Nor should fundamental policy choices be incorporated into a
binding agreement not subject to reconsideration in the light of changing
allocational priorities.
Contrary to the initial assumptions of commentators such as Wel-
lington and Winter, 15 ' the public and public officials have proved them-
selves capable of making necessary tradeoffs between the costs of bargain-
ing demands and the desired costs and levels of services. Reductions in
levels of services and resulting layoffs are no longer a rare occurrence in
the public sector of employment. The increasingly unified taxpayer opposi
tion to any cost increases and the sensitized reactions of recipients of
already reduced services have altered the assumption that tradeoffs cannot
be made because the identity of the resisting group changes from one un-
I" Id. at 1167-68 (footnote omitted).
"' See text at note 11 supra.
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ion's demands to the next.' 52
 It is not to be assumed that the hard-learned
lessons of fiscal crisis will be unlearned easily. It is necessary only to pre-
serve the ability of public employers to balance broad political expressions
of what total cost of services may be tolerable and what level of services will
be acceptable.
A comparison of several possible subjects of bargaining may sharpen
the analysis. Issues of class size, manning requirements, and staff size
guarantees or job security provisions are usually considered to be at least
but no more than permissive subjects of bargaining, in those jurisdictions
which have a permissive category. 153
 Such provisions as they now exist illus-
trate a helpful distinction between binding agreement, which yet allows the
public employer to reduce total costs by reducing the level of services, and
bargaining, which restricts the public employer's ability to do so. Often, a
legislature, PERB, or court will attempt to decide if such issues should be
excluded from mandatory bargaining because they involve determinations
of inherent managerial policy or prerogative. It is submitted that the only
legitimate concern is to protect political tradeoffs and public policy choices.
Accordingly, this proposed model labels subjects of bargaining either man-
datory or illegal.
Applying this criteria to class size, it becomes apparent that a bar-
gained agreement fixing class size, in itself, only determines the varying
costs of varying levels of services. Class size limits only determine how
much of the service will be provided by one employee, and therefore how
many employees will be required, at a bargained cost per employee, to pro-
vide a given level of service chosen by the public employer. Class size pro-
visions do not themselves fix total costs or impede the ability of the public
employer to respond to changing public priorities by reducing the level of
services so as to reduce costs. Rather, class size tends to fix total costs and
staff size only because of the preexisting political determination to provide
a certain level of services. Thus, the argument that bargaining over class
size restricts political tradeoffs is actually based on the fact that political
tradeoffs have already been made. The problem is the nature of commit-
ment in the area of education to a relatively fixed level of services. Class
size may seem to have a great impact on the system as a whole, in the lan-
guage of the balancing standard, only because of that a priori political
commitment. Caseload limits for social workers, for instance, may seem to
have less of an impact on governmental operations only because the politi-
cal commitment to serve all poor people is softer than the commitment to
teach all children. The public cannot have it both ways. In the field of edu-
cation, the political process has already exercised its collective political
'" Recent experience in Swampscott, Massachusetts illustrates the point. Voting on a
special petition instituted by members of the school committee, the town turned down the
selectmen's request to appropriate funds for negotiated police and firefighter agreements.
The school committee members thereby successfully interposed themselves as an interest
group resisting every union's bargaining demands and forcing tradeoffs. Budget rejections
such as in Swampscott are not a rare occurrence. See note 14 supra. Public employers have
been forced to effect tradeoffs between the cost and the level of services by layoffs, as in New
York City where 4000 teachers were laid off in the fall of 1976, GERR No. 679, at B-I1 (Oct.
18, 1976), or by sheer hard bargaining, provoking strikes by teachers in Buffalo for the first
time in 29 years, see Helsby, supra note 28, at F-2, and by state employees in Massachusetts in
1976, see note 35 supra. Other examples are too numerous to mention.
153 See notes 154, 156, and 161 infra.
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choice of the desired level of services depite the costs. In limiting manage-
rial prerogatives regarding the most efficient use of personnel, facilities
and technology, class size provisions tend only to restrict the ability of the
public employer to reduce costs without reducing the level of services. Ac-
cordingly, since class size limits do not fix total costs or impede the ability
of the public employer to reduce services and costs, class size should be a
mandatory subject of bargaining, not excluded from bargaining.'"
Indeed, negotiability considerations should focus on the ability of the
political process to make necessary tradeoffs rather than on managerial
prerogatives and policy used to delineate the mandatory/permissive di-
chotomy. An issue may involve managerial or educational policy concerns
which do not implicate fundamental public policy choices. Bargaining over
class size may involve educational policy considerations about the best way
to teach children or it may interfere with the traditional managerial pre-
rogatives to direct the work force in the interests of the efficiency and qual-
ity of the service. The public is of course deeply concerned with the out-
come of bargaining. The quality and cost of education are at stake. But the
public retains the fundamental policy choice of the level of services given
its quality and cost. Class size is simply one of the costs of the service. Both
the educational policy favoring lower class size and the managerial interest
in maintaining efficiency will never change. Only the public policy choice of
a certain level or quality of services given its total cost may change. Only
that choice need be preserved." 5
Compare to class size provisions the effect of provisions preventing
reductions in staff size even as a result of the elimination of programs or
positions. Staff size and job security guarantees restrict the ability of the
employer to effect budgetary savings by reducing the level of services of-
fered. In so doing staff size provisons hamper the ability of the political
process to effect trade-offs between the cost and level of services. Thus,
staff size and job security provisions should be excluded from negotia-
tions.'" The public employer should remain free generally to abolish posi-
1 " See CAL Gov .-r CODE § 3543.2 (West 1976) (class size mandatory). But see Dept. of
Education, Haw. PERB Dec. No. 26 (1973), reprinted in SMITH, EDWARDS & CLARK, supra note
25, at 446 (class size excluded from bargaining as interfering with managerial responsibility to
maintain efficiency; statewide average class size mandatory, however).
In jurisdictions with permissive categories, class size has been held to be mandatory.
West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Washoe
County Teachers Ass'n v. Washoe County School Dist., 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974)
(overturned in Nevada by statute). See NEV. Rev. STAT. t} 288.150(2) (1975) (class size not in list
of mandatory subjects). Class size has more often been held to be merely permissive. See, e.g.
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973); Biddeford v. Bid-
deford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Se-
ward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); W. Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35
N.Y.2d 51, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974); Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist.
No. 19, 24 Or. App. 751, 547 I'.2d 647 (1976); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of
Educ,, —S.D.—, 215 N.W.2d 837 (1974); Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d
43, 343 N.W.2d 321 (1976), See also IND. CODE ANN. § 20.7-5-1-5 (Burns 1973) (class size per-
missive).
155 g. Department of Education, Haw. PERB Dec. No. 26 (1973), reprinted in SMITH,
EnwAitins & CLARK, supra note 25, at 446 (PERB barred bargaining over class size and schedul-
ing of preparation periods to enable the employer to maintain efficiency; i.e., to be able to re-
duce costs without reducing the level of services). Such exclusions are unnecessary to protect
political tradeoffs and only intrude on proper bargaining tradeoffs.
166 See Crossing Guard Union v. Yonkers, 39 N.Y.2d 964, 354 N.E.2d 846, 387
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tions or programs and streamline services,'" although procedures to be fol-
lowed in the event of the abolition of a position and reductions in force
should be negotiated because of the impact on conditions of employment' 59
The effect of bargaining should never be such as to require the establish-
ment or continued existence of a service, but only the conditions of
employment involved in performing the new or existing service. 159
Bargaining over manning requirements presents a more complicated
problem. Manning requirements may range from fixing the number of
police officers in a patrol car or fire fighters manning an engine to the
number assigned to each station. Manning requirements of the former
variety seem to express more of a concern with workload and safety. In this
sense, manning requirements, like class size limits, tend to fix costs and
staff size only because the pUblic has made the initial policy determination
to provide a given level of service. To the extent that manning re-
quirements fix staff size without regard to workload factors, they should
N.Y.S.2d 105 (1976) (job security provision unenforceable). The Boston Police Department, in
an effort to trim the budget, reduced the number of crossing guards in the city. Boston par-
ents and teachers protested by performing the duty themselves. Boston Globe, March 10,
1977, at 3. Binding agreement on staff size would prevent any such interplay between public
and public employer over the cost and the level of services. But see Susquehanna Valley Cent.
School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (staff size provision enforceable); Matter of Burke v. Bowen, 40 N.Y.2d
264, 353 N.E.2d 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1976) (job security provision enforceable); Board of
Educ. v. Yonkers Fed. of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268,.353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976)
(same); Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976) (provi-
sion tying reductions in staff size to reductions in pupil population mandatory subject).
Nevada excluded staffing levels from mandatory bargaining but not from permissive bargain-
ing. NEV. Ray. STAT. § 288,150(3) (1975).
Tenure decisions have a curious affinity to staff size and job security provisions. The
public policy decision to allow teachers with tenure a degree of job security that differs mark-
edly in quality than that granted most other public employees probably should not be negoti-
able. In that the decision to grant tenure may have an effect tending practically to freeze staff
size and prevent reductions in the levels of service, the substantive decision itself should not be
reviewable by an arbitration panel or court. See City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40
N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976); Board of Educ. v. Bellmore-Merrick
United Secondary Teachers, 39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603, 383 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1976); School
Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877; Reg .] School Comm.
v. Dennis Teachers Ass'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 428, 360 N.E.2d 883; School Comm. of W.
Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater Teachers Ass'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 434, 360 N.E.2d 886.
But see Central Point School Dist. v. Employment Rd. Bd., 27 Or. App. 285, 555 P.2d 1269
(1976); Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist. v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson Teachers Ass'n, 393
Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975).
EM See Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973)
(elimination of chairmanship not arbitrable); School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 1976 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144 (abolition of position not arbitrable).
"8 See Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp]. Rd. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 321 (1976)
(staff' reduction procedures mandatory); Plainfield 13d. of Educ. and Plainfield Educ. Ass'n,
Docket No. SN-76-3 (N.J. PERC 1976), GERR No. 680, at C-5; NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150(2)
(1975). Cf. School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145
(arbitrator could not order reinstatement to position abolished but can order compensation for
violation of contractual procedures regarding resulting demotion or dismissal).
"L) c f West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526, 537
(1972) (board of education alone empowered to determine whether there shall be extra-
curricular activities; however, assignment of teachers to and compensation for extra duty
mandatory); Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231, 241-42
(1976) (bargaining over establishment of summer school and reading program merely permis-
sive although impact on wages and hours is mandatory).
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not be negotiable.'" But a properly defined manning requirement may be
mandatorily negotiable especially where safety considerations are real."' As
with the educational policy involved in class size, the managerial policy
elements in manning levels do not themselves make the issue nonnegoti-
able.'" Fire and crime prevention policy will always favor higher manning
levels. The concern is the ability to balance the public interest in higher
levels and quality of service and the employee interest in safety and lighter
workload against other budgetary demands. Allowing bargaining over
manning requirements only where safety is a significant issue preserves this
political trade-off.
Under the proposed model, a helpful means of determining negotia-
bility is to examine the impact of an issue on conditions of employment.
Public employees should never be bargaining about matters which do not
directly touch the employment relationship. For instance, students' hours of
instruction should never be negotiated'" while teaching load, hours of
teaching and the related subject of preparation periods should be manda-
tory subjects of negotiation. 1 B 4 Although time spent teaching involves con-
'" But see Alpena v. Alpena Fire Fighters Ass'n, 56 Mich. App. 568, 224 N.W.2d 672
(1974) (manning requirements mandatory).
In Town of Danvers and Local 2038, IAFF, MUP-2292, 2299, 3 MASS. LAB. CAS. 1559,
1573 (M.L.R.C. 1977), the commission held that a proposal requiring a minimum number of
personnel to be on duty in a lire house at all times was merely permissive:
Agreement on minimum manning per shift in essence would lock the town into a
certain level of firefighting service for the duration of the collective bargaining
agreement. Accordingly, it represents an intrusion into that type of governmental
decision which should be reserved for the sole discretion of the elected rep-
resentatives of all the citizens of the Town, rather than one which must be sub-
jected to the bargaining process ....
This is precisely the sort of issue which should be excluded from bargaining altogether for the
reasons stated by the MLRC rather than negotiable at the will of the public employer. The
permissive category does not adequately serve the stated concerns.
'°' An arbitrator recently required the Boston Police Department to institute two-man
patrols. Boston Sunday Globe, July 17, 1977, at 4. Such a provision allows the Department to
reduce the level of services if necessary to reduce costs by reducing the number of patrols.
Minimum manning proposals do not allow such reductions in force. It remains to be seen if
the courts will uphold the arbitral award. Cf: Firefighters Local 1186 v. Vallejo, 13 Cal.3d 608,
618-21, 526 P.2d 971, 978.80, 116 Cal. Rptr, 507, 514-16 (1974) (dictum) (manning level
negotiable only to extent it determines workload and safety).
182 But see Firefighters Local 1186 v. Vallejo, 12 Cal.3d 608, 618-21, 526 P.2d 971, 978-
80, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507. 514-16 (1974) (changes in lire prevention policy permit reductions in
manning levels). See also Boston Teachers Union v. School Comm., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515,
1526-27, 350 N.E.2d 707, 714 (changes in educational policy permit changes in class size de-
spite the collective bargaining agreement). See text at notes 139-41 supra.
1 "' But see New York City School Boards Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347
N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S,2d 208 (1976) (bargaining over reduction in student hours permissi-
ble).
'" See NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150(2) (1975) (preparation time and hours of work manda-
tory); West Hartford Hue. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972) (teaching
load and preparation periods mandatory); Department of Educ., Haw. PERK, Dec. No. 26
(1973), reprinted in SMITH. EDWARDS & CLARK, supra note 25, at 446 (preparation periods man-
datory); Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 422 (Me. 1973) (required
presence when not teaching a mandatory subject); Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No.
19, 24 Or. App. 751, 547 P.2d 647 (1976) (teaching toad and preparation periods mandatory).
But see NEV. REV. STAT. (1 288.150(3) (1975) (workload factors merely permissive); West
Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, supra (length of school day merely permissive); Dept. of
Educ., supra (bargaining over scheduling of preparation periods within teaching hours
excluded altogether); Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d at 421 (length of
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ditions of employment, time spent in class by students does not. Since
hours of instruction directly determine the level of services received by stu-
dents, its determination involves a fundamental policy choice balancing the
desire for more educational service against the costs of higher levels.
Especially since class size should be negotiated, hours of instruction should
not, so that the public employer can reduce costs by reducing the level of
services. Thus, questions whether conditions of employment were im-
plicated in students' hours of instruction and provisions freezing staff size
should have alerted the NeW York Court of Appeals to as yet unarticulated
policy concerns precluding bargaining.'" Recognition of this would have
led the court to conclude that those were not proper subjects for collective
bargaining. On the other hand when the impact of an issue such as class
size on conditions of employment is so great that the issue easily might be
translated into wage demands it makes little sense to allow the intrusion of
less important managerial prerogatives on bargaining tradeoffs. Such an
issue directly affects conditions of employment and bargaining over it does
not prevent the public employer from reducing costs by reducing levels of
service. Thus, bargaining over class size should be allowed where it pre-
serves the ability to trade off a reduction on wage demands.
In this framework, "managerial prerogative" becomes more than sim-
ply a question-begging catch phrase. Where relinquishing managerial pre-
rogatives over an issue hampers political balancing of the cost and of the
need for the service then that issue must not be subject to bargaining. An
area of managerial exclusivity serves to protect voter input into the budget-
ary process at a fundamental level.'" At the same time the political per-
spective recognizes an area of concern in which bargaining is appropriate
and necessary. By protecting political input where essential, careful defini-
tion of the scope of bargaining eliminates the excuse for the intrusion of
managerial prerogatives when such intrusion would hamper the ability of
the collective bargaining process to strike its own balances.
The framework limiting the restrictive effect of elements of manage-
rial policy and prerogatives to situations in which fundamental policy
teaching day merely permissive); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Ed. of Educ., — S.D.
— , 215 N.W,2d 837 (1974). Sec also note 67 supra.
'" See Yonkers, supra note 105; School Boards Association, supra note 137.
186
 In fact, the proposed framework recognizes an area of exclusivity protecting political
tradeoffs in the budget-making process even where concern with managerial prerogatives is
non-existent. For example, pay parity provisions should never be negotiable, since they
hamper both political tradeoffs and bargaining tradeoffs, although managerial prerogatives
are of no moment. See, e.g., Local 1219 v. Conn. Labor Rel. Bd., 93 L.R.R.M. 2098 (Conn.
Sup. Ct. 1976); Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976); New York
and Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, N.Y. PERB, Cas. No. U-1496 (1976), GERR No. 694, at 42
(Feb. 7, 1977) (barring negotiations over parity clauses as violative of public policy under Sus-
quehanna); Medford School Comm., 3 MASS. LAB. CAS. 1413, 3 M.L.R.R. 1 106 (M.L.R.C. 1977).
Many jurisdictions preclude or limit bargaining over pension benefits, not because of
concern with managerial prerogatives, but because of the difficulty of striking proper
tradeoffs. See, e.g., FIAW. REV. STAT. § 89-9(d) (1975) (excluding retirement benefits from bar-
gaining); 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 965(4) (1973) (barring pension benefits from binding in-
terest arbitration); N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:13a-8.1 (1965) (precluding bargaining over pensions in
conflict with existing statutes); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 201(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (barring
bargaining over pension). Apparently, since pension benefits represent costs to be borne in the
future and pension plans are too complicated For the public or even public officials to un-
derstand, the fear is that tradeoffs involving the costs of present services will not be properly
made.
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choices are implicated and limiting bargaining to the area of the employ-
ment relationship is equally applicable to decisions not primarily involving
budgetary concerns. For instance, personnel decisions involving the selec-
tion, direction, promotion, transfer or discipline of personnel . involve man-
agerial concerns with the quality and efficiency of a service. In certain situ-
ations where the decision may strongly affect conditions of employment,
the public interest. in the quality of governmental services must be balanced
against the impact on individual employees in determining what can and
cannot be bargained. Obviously, bargaining over procedures for the selec-
tion of personnel should not be allowed since the issue does not affect con-
ditions of employment until the employee is hired. The public and groups
served by the public employer still have more of a direct interest in the
selection process.'" The policy behind preserving the public employer's
nonreviewable discretion to make promotions or transfers is equally
strong,'" but because of the generalized impact on all employees interested
in or affected by promotion or transfer, evaluation procedures and the
criteria for the decision ought to be bargained.'" When the issue of con-
cern is discipline or dismissal of a public employee, the public interest no
longer outweighs the employees' interest in bargaining over procedures for
substantive review of the decision pursuant to a just cause standard.'" The
effect on the individual employee is substantial, and existing statutory pro-
cedures should not bar contractual procedures for review."'
167 See Board of Higher Educ., 7 PERB	 3028 (1974), quoted in Clark, supra note 33, at
29. PERB argued that a proposal to bar or limit student membership on a faculty hiring
committee was an issue of social concern 10 many groups in the community. However, PERB
only held that the Board could not be required to bargain. The proposal should not even be
negotiable. The university's ultimate determination may be to exclude students but the deci-
sion should be accountable and open to influence from all groups.
1 " Cf: Clifton Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 136 N.J. Super. 336, 346 A.2d 107
(1975) (school board has exclusive, non-negotiable right, to assess quality of teacher perform-
ance); Board of Educ. v. North Bergen Fed. of Teachers, 141 N.J. Super. 97, 357 A.2d 302
(App. Div. 1976) (school board has exclusive nonarbitrable right to select candidates for pro-
motion from within or without bargaining unit). But d: IND. CODE ANN. § 20.7-5-1-5 (Burns
1973) (bargaining over selection, assignment. or promotion of personnel permissive); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 288.150(3) (1975) (right to assign or transfer personnel reserved to employer but bar-
gaining permissive); Milberry v. Board of Educ., 467 Pa. 79, 354 A.2d 559 (1976) (un-
satisfactory performance rating arbitrable though a basis of dismissal proceedings).
1 " Cf. Board of Educ. v. North Bergen Fed. of Teachers, 141 N.J. Super. 97, 357 A.2d
302 (App. Div. 1976) (though promotion decision not arbitrable, criteria and procedures are
mandatory subjects); Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulsen, 239 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1976) (dictum)
(bargaining over transfer procedures probably mandatory); Beloit v. Wisconsin Ernp. Rel.
Comm'n, 73 Wis.2d 243, 242 N.W.2c1 231 (1976) (bargaining over evaluation procedures and
files mandatory); IOWA Cone ANN. § 20.9 (1974) (evaluation procedures mandatory). But cf.
Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No, 19, 24 Or. App. 751, 547 P.2d 647 (1976) (transfer
procedures merely permissive); Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 62 111.2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7
(1975) (evaluation procedures neither negotiable nor arbitrable).
1 " See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN, 34:13A-5.3 (West 1965), supra note 88.
"` See, e.g., Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. Pontiac, 397 Mich. 674, 246 N.W.2d 831
(1976) (bargained grievance procedures prevail over city's civilian review board); Board of
Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d
17 (1972) (school board can bargain over grievance procedure for review of dismissal despite
Tenure Law procedures); Danville Bd. of School Directors v. Fifield, 132 Vt. 271, 275-76, 315
A.2d 473 (1974). But see, e.g., Superintending School Comm. v. Winslow Educ. Ass'n, 363 A.2d
229 (Me. 1976) (just cause provision merely permissive because of policy expressed in existing
statutory procedures); Local 1905, AFCSME v. Recorder's Court Judges, 94 L.R.R.M. 2392
(Mich. Sup. Ct. 1976) (statute establishing dismissal procedures for court employees prevails
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in addition, negotiations should never be allowed over issues which
determine the nature of the service provided. 172 The nature of the service
is an issue of political power at the core of public concern about the politi-
cal objectives toward which government resources will be committed. While
public employees may and should be consulted,'" binding, bilateral agree-
ments should not be allowed to preclude collective expressions about the
nature of the service paid for and received, since individual choice is not
possible. 17" Curriculum, for example, can be a subject of intense political
conflict. Subjects such as abortion or sex education arouse furious political
controversy.'" The interests of the taxpayers in the use of their taxes and
of parents in the education of their children demand that decisions about
such sensitive issues not be resolved in collective bargaining. 176
The public policy concern with the nature of the service provided in-
cludes an interest in the relationship between public employees and those
to whom they provide the service. It might be better that teachers not bar-
gain about procedures for discipline of students" 7 nor police about civilian
over bargained grievance procedure); Teamsters Local 320 v. Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410,
225 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1975) (municipal charter provision prevails).
However, the decision to grant or to deny tenure should not be reviewable, although
violations of contractual evaluation procedures precedent to dismissal should be arbitrable. See
note 156 and cases cited therein.
'" "The issue is not a threshold one of whether professional public employees should
participate in decisions about the nature of the services they provide .... The issue rather is
the method of that participation." Wellington & Winter, supra note 8, at 859.
1 " See, e.g., Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Teachers Ass'n, 54 App. Div.2d
984, 389 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1976) (violation of agreement that joint committee of teachers and
administrators shall make advisory recommendations concerning curriculum changes is
arbitrable); CAL. GovT CODE § 3543.2 (West 1976) (allows consultation but not bargaining over
curriculum).
'" To say that curriculum content is not a proper subject of bargaining does not
mean that teachers have no legitimate interest in that subject nor that they
should not participate in curriculum decisions. It means only that the bargaining
table is the wrong forum and the collective agreement is the wrong instrument
.... NI° organization should purport to act as an exclusive representative; the
discussions should not be closed; and the decision should not be bargained for or
solidified as an agreement. In addition, all of the ordinary political processes
should remain open for individuals or groups of teachers to make their views
known to the politically responsible officials and.thus to influence the decision.
Summers, supra note 149, at 1195 (footnote omitted).
"6 For instance, the superintendent of schools in Framingham, Massachusetts was fight-
ing for his job as a result of his advocacy of sex education. See The Boston Evening Globe,
Dec. 20, 1976 at 3, col. 3. See also Board of Educ. v. Rockaway Township Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.J.
Super. 564, 295 A.2d 380 (1972) (bargaining agreement cannot allow teacher to discuss abor-
tion if Board directs otherwise).
ITS Cf. CAL. GOVT ConE § 3543.2 (West 1976) (allowing consultation but barring bar-
gaining over definition of educational objectives, determination of course content and cur-
riculum, and textbook selection); Board of Educ. v. Rockaway Township Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.J.
Super. 564, 295 A.2d 380 (1972) (collective bargaining agreement cannot delegate to teachers
the selection of courses of study). Bat cf. National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan.
741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973) (bargaining over curriculum permissible, though not mandatory);
Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972) (dictum)
(same); Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulsen, 239 N.W.2d 842, 848 (N.D. 1976) (dictum) (curriculum
probably mandatory); IND. ConE ANN. § 20.7-5-1-5 (Burns 1973) (permissive).
' 77 But see IND. CODE ANN. § 20.7-5-1-5 (Burns 1973) (student discipline a permissive sub-
ject of bargaining); Washoe County Teachers Ass'n v. Washoe County School Dist., 90 Nev.
447, 530 P.2d 114 (1974) (mandatory); Sutherline Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. No. 30, 25 Or.
App. 85, 548 P.2d 204 (1976) (student disciplinary and referral procedures at least permissive,
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review boards which investigate allegations of police misconduct, because
such negotiations relate closely to the nature of the service provided, which
is at the core of the public concern.'" Safety may be an important condi-
tion of employment over which bargaining should take place. Beyond the
concern with safety the impact of bargaining on the nature of the service
provided may outweigh any employee interests. In a sense the concern is to
prevent public employees from bargaining over who is eligible to receive
the service. Public employees should not be bargaining about whether they
will deliver a service, where they will perform the service, or who will get
the benefit of the service.
Collective bargaining should not be used to make it harder for in-
terested groups to affect politically decisions of public interest whose major
impact extends beyond the employment relationship. Bilateral bargaining
necessarily excludes the concerns of other interest groups except as the
public employer is able and willing to represent or consider those concerns
in its bargaining decisions. The proposed model for negotiability de-
terminations, without the interference of the permissive category, is sensi-
tive to the need to protect the ability of the political process to strike its
own balances. The public must be left free to determine the direction in
which governmental resources should be channeled. Of course, in decisions
about the level or nature of services where binding agreement is in-
appropriate, the public employer should be encouraged or required to con-
sult with its employees, if only to take advantage of available resources.
That the decision reached thereby may be the same as would have been
reached in bargaining does not militate against consultation, since the deci-
sion is open to influence and reconsideration by all members of the public,
including public employees.
In the end, assessments of the degree to which binding agreement
over any issue restricts the necessary tradeoffs between cost and level of
services will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The degree to which re-
strictions to whatever extent perceived will be politically acceptable will also
vary. That each jurisdiction has to make a choice and that the choice may
differ does not militate against the model proposed. The choice between
the interests of the public and the interests of public employees is a political
choice, subject to shifting currents of political power. At the very least,
scope of bargaining determinations should confront the political conflict di-
rectly.
may be mandatory); Beloit v. Wisconsin Emp. Rd. Comm'n, 73 Wis.2d 243, 242 N.W.2d 251
(1976) (mandatory bargaining over procedures to follow if misbehavior threatens physical
safety; permissive otherwise).
Unlike an issue like class size where the teachers are bargaining for a result which
furthers student interests, teachers and school boards alike have no incentive to protect the in-
terests of a student alleged to be a disciplinary problem. The threat to the interest of students
arising from disciplinary action is serious enough to be of constitutional proportions, requiring
due process protections of notice and hearing. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also
Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Government Relations, 30 Mn. L. REV. 179,
195 (1970).
"8 See generally Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. Pontiac, 397 Mich. 674, 246 N.W.2d 831
(1976) (existence of a civilian review board in a home rule city did not violate the public policy
favoring bargaining but could not preclude the operation of a negotiated grievance procedure
for review of disciplinary action).
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CONCLUSION
A continuing political conflict underlies public sector bargaining. Pub-
lic employees seek a meaningful voice in decisions affecting their conditions
of employment. But collective bargaining grants public employees a relative
advantage over other interest groups in affecting the governmental
decison-making process, particularly those decisions allocating govern-
mental resources. As a result, many of those jurisdictions that granted bar-
gaining rights sought to resolve the conflict by prohibiting strikes and limit-
ing those decisions subject to bargaining. Efforts to preserve a core area of
policy concern focused, as in the private sector, on limiting those issues sub-
ject to mandatory bargaining. It was thought that the public employer's dis-
cretionary decision whether to bargain over issues involving elements of
public policy and managerial prerogative would protect the political process
because the responsible public official would be politically accountable.
The poor economic climate of the past few years, however, created an
often hostile reaction to the results of collective bargaining. Recently, the
initial resolutions of the underlying conflict have been undergoing exten-
sive reappraisal. For instance, recent experience questions the legitimacy of
the strike prohibition. Moreover, in those jurisdictions which continue to
ban strikes, the need for some form of binding impasse resolution is
heightened, not only to improve the functioning of collective bargaining
but also to reduce the incentive to strike. But the intensity of political op-
position to strikes and interest arbitration suggests that the parallel attempt
to resolve the political conflict by limiting the range of bargainable issues
may not be working well either. Recent judicial decisions in New York and
Massachusetts, reintroducing policy concerns restrictive of permissible bar-
gaining at the contract enforcement stage, may reflect a growing feeling
that a permissive category of issues does not adequately protect fundamen-
tal public policy choices.
Use of the permissive category in public sector bargaining fails
adequately to protect the political process and, under the cover of policy
concerns, intrudes too heavily upon the appropriate subjects of bargaining.
The political accountability of public officials for permissive bargaining is
overstated. Furthermore, even if the public official is accountable, the
agreement made is not, since agreement as to permissive issues is binding.
If agreement is declared to be unenforceable, the tradeoffs made in bar-
gaining are severely disrupted. Since collective bargaining is essentially a
bilateral process, other interest groups may be effectively excluded from
the decision-making process at least for the life of the agreement.
Reliance on existing enactments as evidence that an issue ought to be
resolved politically recognizes the underlying political conflict only in a
backhand manner. The existing standards for negotiability must be revised
to enhance their sensitivity both to necessary political tradeoffs and appro-
priate bargaining tradeoffs. Collective bargaining is appropriate and neces-
sary in areas which determine only the labor cost of services at the level
chosen by the public employer or by the public itself. The public or public
employer must remain free to determine the desired level or nature of a
service given its total cost. These choices reflect significant ideological dif-
ferences about the social and political priorities and objectives to which
governmental resources must be directed. But managerial policy and pre-
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rogative become important only where necessary to protect fundamental
policy choices.
The permissive category should be eliminated, legislatures, courts and
PERBs can no longer avoid hard choices by declaring that an issue involves
policy considerations but leaving to the employer the decision whether to
bargain. Legislative bodies in particular must be sensitive to the need to
confront the difficult issues despite the pressure to compromise by leaving
politically distasteful choices to be resolved by judicial or administrative
bodies.
The scope of bargaining in the public sector must be defined in a way
that directly confronts the underlying political conflict. Perhaps even the
overdetermined political opposition to the strike and binding forms of im-
passe resolution could be partially defused if the scope of bargaining were
so defined. In areas of decision-making where bargaining is appropriate, it
might be possible to see the strike and interest arbitration merely as addi-
tional structural incidents of a duty to bargain which by itself grants public
employees a relative advantage in the political process. In any event, the
proposed standard for determining negotiability in the absence of a per-
missive category attempts to protect the developing ability of the political
process to effect necessary tradeoffs. Where fundamental policy choices are
left open to broad political participation, appropriate bargaining tradeoffs
may be more readily acceptable. Freeing political tradeoffs from the intru-
sion of collective bargaining may ultimately leave the bargaining process
freer from unnecessary intrusion.
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